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CASE NOTES
Administrative Law-A Director Appearing at a Securities and Exchange
Commission Investigation of a Corporation Has the Right To Be Represented
by the Corporation's Counsel.--In an investigation of an offer and sale of
corporate stock, the Securities and Exchange Commission subpoenaed respon-
dent, a director of the corporation, and advised him that it was invoking its se-
questration rule' which would preclude respondent's attorney from representing
him. The ground for the invocation of the rule was that the attorney had already
represented another director at the hearing and was also the corporate attorney.
Because of the Commission's ruling, the respondent refused to appear. The Com-
mission applied for, and was granted, an enforcement order by the United States
district court. However, this order was conditional on the Commission's accep-
tance of the respondent's attorney.2 This order was upheld on appeal, the court
holding that the invocation of the sequestration rule violated the appellee's stat-
utory right to counsel. SEC v. Higashi, 359 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1966).
The basis of the court's decision was that the respondent's interests were com-
mon to those of the corporation, since, as a director, he could be held responsible
for the corporate acts. The attorney most familiar with his possible liabilities and
defenses would be the corporate counsel. To deprive respondent of this attorney
would be an unreasonable infringement upon his statutory right to counsel.s It
was also suggested that requiring independent counsel might place a financial
hardship upon the respondent.4
The right of a witness appearing at a federal agency proceeding to be repre-
sented by counsel has been expanded over the years. The earlier decisions ruled
that a witness who was compelled to appear in a purely investigative proceeding,
as distinguished from an adjudicative hearing, was not entitled to counsel.s It
1. 17 C.F.R. § 203.7(b) (Supp. 1966), which provides: "Any person compelled to appear,
or who appears by request or permission of the Commission, in person at a formal investiga-
tive proceeding may be accompanied, represented and advised by counsel . . . provided,
however, that all witnesses shall be sequestered, and unless permitted in the discretion
of the officer conducting the investigation no witness or the counsel accompanying any such
witness shall be permitted to be present during the examination of any other witness called
in such proceeding." (Italics omitted.)
2. For a discussion of judicial supervision of administrative proceedings, see Carrow,
Types of Judicial Relief from Administrative Action, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 8-22 (1958).
The author points out that adjudication, licensing and investigation proceedings are subject
to judicial intervention. When deciding to intervene, the court will consider the legality of
the agency action, the possible infliction of irreparable injury by the proceeding, and the
extent to which such private injury is offset by the public interest.
3. The court stated: "Here the act of sequestration . .. bears directly and prejudicially
upon the interests of the witness himself. Since his interests are common with those of the
corporation for whose acts he may be held responsible, to sequester corporation counsel
is to deprive the witness of the services of the attorney most familiar with the source of his
vulnerability." 359 F.2d at 553.
4. Id. at 553 n.5.
5. E.g., Bowles v. Baer, 142 F.2d 787 (7th Cir. 1944). In this case, the Office of Price
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was reasoned that since no conclusive findings were being made, representation
was a privilege which could be extended at the discretion of the agency.0
Today, such a witness is guaranteed by statute7 the right to be accompanied,
represented, and advised by counsel regardless of the type of proceeding in-
volved.8 In FCC v. Schreiber,9 the court clearly indicated that the legislative
history of the statute and its phraseology denote that Congress intended a wit-
ness in an agency investigation to have such a right to counsel.
The individual's statutory right to counsel must be balanced against the pub-
lic interest served by allowing federal agencies to efficiently regulate their areas
of jurisdiction. In the instant case, the court conceded the necessity for the
sequestration rule,' 0 noting that investigation of possible federal securities law
infractions is difficult to undertake, and that it is often necessary to preclude the
possibility that a witness's testimony might be overheard by someone who could
Administration ordered fifteen people to testify about their dealings with a certain company
under investigation. They were all represented by the attorney for the company, After asking
a few questions, the presiding official of the OPA requested the attorney to leave. He
responded that he could not do so unless authorized by his clients. The witnesses then
refused to answer any questions without the advice of the attorney. The OPA then re-
quested an order from the district court ordering the witnesses to appear without the
attorney. The court granted the order, provided the proceeding be a public one. The OPA
then appealed to the court of appeals which reasoned that the proceeding was investigative,
and as such did not have to be public, nor did the OPA have to grant rights of attorney
to the witnesses.
6. See White, Weld & Co., 1 S.E.C. 574 (1936). Here it was indicated that respondents
at an investigative proceeding could be granted the privilege of counsel at the discretion of
the Commission. If extended, it was to be considered a courtesy. Cf. United States ex rel.
Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149 (1923). See also Comment, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 1214,
1216-17 (1941).
7. Administrative Procedure Act § 6(a), 60 Stat. 240 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1005(a) (1964),
which provides: "Any person compelled to appear in person before any agency or representa-
tive thereof shall be accorded the right to be accompanied, represented, and advised by coun-
sel or, if permitted by the agency, by other qualified representative."
8. Murchison, Rights of Persons Compelled to Appear in Federal Agency Investigational
Hearings, 62 Mich. L. Rev. 485, 492-93 (1963). See also Newman, Federal Agency Investiga-
tions: Procedural Rights of the Subpoenaed Witness, 60 Mich. L. Rev. 169, 170-80 (1961). In
this article, the author discusses the witness's rights to counsel, to a transcript, to a public
or private hearing, to notice, to answer completely, and to confront and cross examine
witnesses.
9. 329 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1964), modified on other grounds, 381 U.S. 279 (1965). Both
the majority and dissenting opinions agreed that witnesses have a right to counsel. In the
dissenting opinion, a statement made by Congressman Francis Walters on the floor of the
House was quoted: "'The representation of counsel contemplated by the bill means full
representation as the term is understood in the courts of law.'" Id. at 537 n.37. See also
In the Matter of Neil, 209 F. Supp. 76 (S.D.W. Va. 1962); United States v. Smith, 87 F.
Supp. 293 (D. Conn. 1949) ; Murchison, supra note 8, at 492.
10. 359 F.2d at 552. For a further discussion of when witnesses' testimony should not be
disclosed to other witnesses see In re Bonanno, 344 F.2d 830, 834 (2d Cir. 1965); United
States v. Tramunti, 343 F.2d 548, 552 (2d Cir. 1965).
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later relate it to a future witness. Sequestration of counsel as well as witnesses, in
other words, reduces the difficulties often encountered in attempting to prove a
conspiracy.
United States v. Steel1 illustrates the sequestration rule. There, the defendant
was charged with violations of the Securities Act of 1933 and the mail fraud
statute.'2 The defendant had been one of the officers of the corporation under
investigation. When she was summoned to appear before the investigative pro-
ceedings of the Securities and Exchange Commission, she appeared with an
attorney who was also general counsel to the corporation. The Commission
invoked the sequestration rule. This invocation was one of the grounds used by
the defendant in moving for a dismissal of the indictments. The district court
denied the motion, reasoning that the Administrative Procedure Act 13 guaranteed
a right to counsel, but not an absolute right to counsel of one's choice. By pre-
cluding the corporate counsel, the Commission did not deprive the defendant of
all counsel, but merely of one particular attorney. The instant case cited the
Steel case, but distinguished it on the ground that here, "sequestration . . .
bears directly and prejudicially upon the interests of the witness... since his
interests are common with those of the corporation for whose acts he may be
held responsible.... ."14
The distinction is a questionable one. The defendant in Steel, as an ex-officer
of the corporation, was in the same position as the respondent in the instant
case. To deprive her of the corporate counsel would be to deprive her of the
attorney most familiar with her sources of "rvulnerability." The sequestration
rule certainly bore directly on her interests.' 5
It would appear, therefore, that the reasoning of the instant court warrants
further examination. The contention that the respondent, a corporate director,
was entitled to the corporate counsel since the latter, due to his intimate knowl-
edge of the dispute, could offer the most able representation,' 0 is, in the light of
prior decisions, a strange one.
11. 238 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1964).
13. See note 7 supra.
14. 359 F.2d at 553. The public interest served by upholding the sequestration rule
seems far more significant than the inconvenience or expense caused by requiring one in-
dividual to go to the trouble of securing a different attorney. See 6 Wigmore, E vidence
§ 1840, at 362 (3d ed. 1940), in which the author discusses the possibilities of abuse when
an attorney consults with a sequestered witness. Cf. FCC v. Schreiber, 329 F.2d S17, 526
(9th Cir. 1964).
15. In Torras v. Stradley, 103 F. Supp. 737 (NfD. Ga. 1951), it was held that a witness
in an Internal Revenue tax investigation was not entitled to the same attorney employed
by the taxpayer being investigated. However, a more recent decision seems to have over-
ruled the Torras case. In Backer v. Commissioner, 275 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1960), it was held
that any person compelled to appear in person before any agency has the right to counsel
of his choice. In this case the taxpayer's accountant was allowed to be represented by the
taxpayer's attorney. See generally Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954) ; Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45 (1932); United States v. Bergamo, 154 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1946). All of the
above cases dealt with the individual's right to be represented by counsel of his choice.
16. See note 3 supra.
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Litigation dealing with the right of an organization official to be represented
by the organization's counsel when the organization itself is or may be a party
in the suit generally falls within two types of cases. The first is the shareholder's
derivative suit; the second is a suit by a labor union member against a union
leader on behalf of the union.
In the first of these two lines of cases, the defendant director or officer is fre-
quently represented by the corporate counsel,' 7 despite the fact that the corpora-
tion is, in theory at least, the plaintiff.' 8 In Murphy v. Washington Am. League
Base Ball Club, Inc.,19 the plaintiff stockholder sought to enjoin the directors of
the corporation from paying salary increases recently voted to the corporate
officers. Although not a direct issue in the case, the court commented at length
that separate counsel should be retained by the defendant director. Had the
director been served in the suit, he would have been enjoined from using corpo-
rate counsel.20 The problem is one of conflict of interest. Can the attorney effec-
tively represent both the director and the corporation when their interests are
theoretically adverse? The Murphy court thought not, despite the fact that the
corporate counsel is the one attorney most qualified to represent the director,
and despite financial inconvenience caused by requiring the director to secure
independent counsel.
In Milone v. English,12 union members sued union officials to recover on behalf
of the union monies used to defend the officials in another litigation. The union
general counsel represented the defendants. The court stated:
In other words, counsel who are chosen by and represent officers . . . and who also
represent the union, are not able to guide the litigation in the best interest oT the union
because of the conflict in counsel's loyalties. In such a situation it would be incumbent
upon counsel not to represent both the union and the officers.22
17. In Lewis v. Shaffer Stores Co., 218 F. Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), a shareholder's
derivative suit, it was held that a corporate officer and the corporation must be represented
by separate counsel. In Boyd v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 51 Nev. 264, 274 Pac. 7 (1929), a
corporate director was not allowed to be represented by the corporation's ex-attorney. See
generally Marco v. Dulles, 169 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 268 F.2d 192
(2d Cir. 1959); Strong v. International Bldg. Loan & Inv. Union, 183 Ill. 97, 55 N.E. 675
(1899); Wait v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 81 Nev. 612, 407 P.2d 912 (1965); Hawkins
v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 67 Nev. 248, 216 P.2d 601 (1950).
18. See Note, 74 Yale L.J. 524 (1965). For a discussion of the problems of counsel In
a derivative corporate suit, see McDaniel, Ethical Problems of Counsel for Big Business:
The Burden of Resolving Conflicting Interests, 38 A.B.A.J. 205 (1952).
19. 324 F.2d 394 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
20. Id. at 397-98. Plaintiff had initiated earlier unsuccessful litigation against defendant
in an attempt to block the directors from moving the franchise from Washington, D.C.
to Minnesota, Murphy v. Washington Am. League Base Ball Club, Inc., 267 F.2d 655
(D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 387 (1959). Once in Minnesota, the corpora-
tion prospered and the directors voted salary increases. In addition to requesting an injunc-
tion against the salary increases, plaintiff also requested that counsel to the corporation be
enjoined from representing certain directors.
21. 306 F.2d 814 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
22. Id. at 817.
In International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Hoffa,23 plaintiff union sought to recoup
from the union president monies used to defend him in a criminal proceeding. The
president was represented in both suits by the union's counsel. This case is dis-
tinguished from Milone in that the union moved to be joined as a co-defendant.
Thus, counsel would not be required to represent both plaintiff and defendants,
but merely co-defendants. The court nevertheless held that separate counsel
would have to be retained, and, once retained, that the union could again move to
appear as a defendant.24
In cases dealing with union suits, as in the corporate cases, the possibility of
conflict of interest has been decisive. The court has never been disposed to deter-
mine which counsel knew more about the defendant's potential liabilities. The
instant court's "vulnerability" argument -5 certainly departs from these prece-
dents.
There was just such a conflict of interest in the instant case. The attorney, in
addition to being the corporate counsel, represented another director of the
corporation 6 who had made an earlier appearance at the investigation.2 T Either
this director or the respondent, or both, could have been held responsible for the
corporate act.28
Also, the possibility of a derivative suit- 9 arising out of the results of the Com-
mission's investigation warrants consideration. Here, both parties to the suit, the
plaintiff corporation and the defendant director, would have been represented
by the same counsel before the investigation. Is it reasonable to ex-pect an attor-
ney to adequately represent two witnesses at an investigation when their testi-
mony, given under his guidance, might make one liable to the other at a later
date?
23. 242 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1965).
24. Id. at 256-57.
25. See note 3 supra.
26. Brief for Appellant, pp. 4-7, SEC v. Higashi, 359 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1966).
27. 359 F.2d at 552.
28. Id. at 553. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 clearly establishes joint and
several liability of all controlling persons. 48 Stat. 899 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1964). As
the Commission pointed out to the court, if a violation existed the respondent would be rep-
resented by an attorney whose primary representation was of another individual who might
he responsible for the same act. Brief for Appellant, pp. 28-29, SEC v. Higashi, 359 F.2d 550
(9th Cir. 1966).
29. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides for a fine as one of the penalties
for a violation of the statute. 48 Stat. 904 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1964).
If as a result of the investigation the corporation in the instant case were fined, a stock-
holder could institute a derivative suit, on behalf of the corporation, against the responsible
corporate official or officials to recoup the corporate assets lost in paying the fine. For
examples of statutory violations being the basis of a derivative suit, see, e.g., Kirrane v.
Boone, 334 Mo. 558, 66 S.W2d 861 (1933); Moore v. Keystone Macaroni Mfg. Co., 370
Pa. 172, 87 A.2d 295 (1952). In Lattin, The Law of Corporations 348 (1959), the author
states: "Whether the corporation has a cause of action will depend upon whether or not
its assets have been lost or destroyed or depreciated or its business interfered with by the
wrongful act of the parties charged .... "
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To compound the problem of conflicting interests, the attorney himself was an
officer of the corporation and as such could also be held responsible for the corpo-
rate acts. Not only would he be aware of respondent's potential liabilities, but he
would also be acutely aware of his own. As the court stated in Teamsters, "po-
tential, no less than actual, conflict disqualifies counsel from serving in a double
capacity ... ."30
It is therefore submitted that the instant court erred in denying the Commnis-
sion's appeal. When presented with a situation where a conflict existed between
both directors, between the attorney and the directors, and among all three indi-
viduals and the corporation, it should have prohibited counsel from representing
more than one party.
Bankruptcy--Carry Back Refunds Held To Be an Asset of the Bankrupt's
Estate.-Petitioners filed voluntary bankruptcy petitions in September 1961,
and a trustee was then appointed. Since the petitioners' partnership had suffered
an operating loss during the year 1961, the trustee filed for a carry back tax
refund under section 172(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.1 The In-
ternal Revenue Service allowed the losses to be carried back to the years 1959
and 1960, reducing the tax due for those years. The refund was paid to the
trustee. The petitioners then applied to the referee for the refund. The referee
denied petitioners' application2 and the decision was upheld by the United States
Supreme Court. The Court held that the trustee was entitled to the loss carry
back refund even though the claim was only a contingent or potential one at
the time the petition was filed. Segal v. Rockelle, 382 U.S. 375 (1966).8
Under section 70(a) (5) of the Bankruptcy Act,4 the trustee, after his appoint-
ment, is vested by operation of law with all "property .. .which prior to the
filing of the petition [the bankrupt] . . . could by any means have trans-
ferred . . ... ,
Thus, to award a tax carry back refund to the trustee under section 70(a) (5),
30. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Hoffa, 242 F. Supp. 246, 256 (D.D.C. 1965). This
potential conflict of interest was also recognized by the court in the instant case: "advice to
a witness-client by an attorney whose primary representation is of someone else may not be
in the witness' best interests." 359 F.2d at 552. In Randazzo v. United States, 339 F.2d 79
(5th Cir. 1964), counsel for appellant, who had been convicted of contempt for refusing to
answer questions after a grant of immunity, was not allowed to appear since the questions
related to another of his clients.
1. This section provides that "there shall be allowed as a deduction for the taxable year
an amount equal to the aggregate of (1) the net operating loss carryovers to such year, plus
(2) the net operating loss carrybacks to such year."
2. In the Matter of Segal, 221 F. Supp. 282 (N.D. Tex. 1963), afi'd. sub. nona. Segal v.
Rochelle, 336 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1964).
3. 52 A.BA.J. 274, 40 Ref. J. 44.
4. 52 Stat. 879 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (5) (1964).
5. Ibid.
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it had to be established that at the time the bankruptcy petition was filed, the
refund was both "property" and "transferable." 6 Prior to the instant decision,
two decisions of the courts of appeals, In the Matter of Sussman and Fournier
v. Rosenblum,8 had held that a loss carry back refund was not transferable
property under section 70(a) (5). In reference to the property aspect of the
problem, the Fournier court said that the bankrupt "could point to no existing
fund and to no existing right in which he had any legal or equitable interest." 9
Although In the Matter of Sussman also held that a carry back tax refund did
not pass to the trustee, that court felt that the result was an "unfortunate...
'windfall to the bankrupt at the expense of the creditors.' "10 Both courts re-
gretted that the language of section 70(a) (5) prevented the accrual of the
refund to the trustee but felt that the only remedy was legislative amendment.11
The instant Court observed that numerous cases interpreting section 70(a) (5)
have construed the term "property" to include contingent property.12 The Court
reasoned that since the loss was generated out of pre-bankruptcy transactions,
the benefit of the refund properly belonged to the creditors, and should therefore
pass to the trustee.13
In the Supreme Court, the trustee argued that the carry back refund was
transferable by operation of law, and that this satisfied section 70(a) (5). The
Court observed that this argument made "redundant the alternative route for com-
plying with section 70a(5) through showing that the property 'might have been
levied upon and sold under judicial process .. . .,' 14 The Court then stated
that in order to satisfy the transferability requirement, the deduction must be
capable of being voluntarily tranferred by the bankrupt.1 The Sussman court
also recognized that section 70(a) (5) required voluntary transferability, 10 and
ruled that carry back refunds do not meet this requisite because of the anti-
assignment statute.' 7 This statute prohibits the assignment of claims against the
6. The Act defines transfer as including "the sale and every other and different mode,
direct or indirect, of disposing of or of parting with property or with an interest therein...
or of fixing a lien upon property or upon an interest therein, absolutely or conditionally, volun-
tarily or involuntarily, by or without judicial proceedings, as a conveyance, sale, assignment,
payment, pledge, mortgage, lien, encumbrance, gift, security, or otherwise; the retention of
a security title to property delivered to a debtor shall be deemed a transfer suffered by such
debtor . . . ." 66 Stat. 420 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 1 (30) (1964).
7. 289 F.2d 76 (3d Cir. 1961), 14 Stan. L. Rev. 380 (1962).
8. 318 F.2d 525 (1st Cir. 1963).
9. Id. at 527.
10. 289 F.2d at 78.
11. Ibid.; Fournier v. Rosenblum, 318 F.2d 525, 527 (1st Cir. 1963).
12. 382 U.S. at 379.
13. Id. at 379-80; see 60 Nw. U.L. Rev. 122, 127 (1965) ; 42 Texas L. Rev. 542, 547 (1964).
14. 382 U.S. at 382. (Footnote omitted.)
15. Id. at 382-83.
16. Section 70(a) provides: "The trustee ... shall... be vested by operation of law with
(5) property . . . which prior to the filing of the petition he could by any means have
transferred . . . ." 52 Stat. 879 (1938), as amended, 11 U..C. § 110(a) (1964).
17. 289 F.2d at 78.
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United States unless such assignments have been specifically permitted by the
government, the amounts of the claims have been ascertained, and the assign-
ment has been made in the prescribed manner.1 8 The present Court stated that
carry backs can be transferred voluntarily despite the anti-assignment statute,
relying on Martin v. National Sur. Co.19 It was there held that the statute was
designed to protect the government from needless litigation, 0 and if the govern-
ment is so protected, assignments will be recognized.2'
While the law with respect to carry back refunds is settled by this decision,
the question of whether a carry-over deduction will be allowed to vest in the
trustee is still undecided. The Court in the principal case expressed no opinion
as to the status of the bankrupt's carry-overs,22 but pointed out that its reasoning
with regard to carry backs might not be applicable to carry-overs. 28 As in the
case of a carry back, the carry-over would have to satisfy the "property" and
"transferability" requirements. However, it is impossible for the carry-over to
meet the transfer requirement of section 70(a) (5). The individual taxpayer
must either use the carry-over or forfeit the deduction. Moreover, a corporate
taxpayer is in the same position. Although the Internal Revenue Code does
permit a corporation to use its deduction in some instances where there has
been a change in the ownership of the corporation,24 this change in ownership
does not transfer the carry-over from the taxpayer originally entitled to it. The
corporation is still the only party entitled to use the deduction.28 Furthermore,
it is unclear whether the carry-over could be considered to be "property." 2 0
18. Rev. Stat. § 3477 (1875), as amended, 31 U.S.C. § 203 (1964).
19. 300 U.S. 588 (1937). The respondent entered into an agreement to act as surety for
a contractor. The contractor assigned his payments under the contract to the surety. He
later assigned the same monies to a creditor, the petitioner. The Court found for the surety.
20. Id. at 594.
21. Id. at 596. The instant Court cited a case from petitioner's home state, Texas, Trinity
Universal Ins. Co. v. First State Bank, 143 Tex. 164, 183 S.W.2d 422 (1944), which enforced
the transfers as between the parties. 382 U.S. at 384. The reliance on Texas cases in what is
essentially a question of federal law indicates that the Court was only pointing out the de
facto treatment of assignments on the state level rather than giving a definitive interpretation
of the anti-assignment statute.
22. 382 U.S. at 381.
23. Ibid. The Court noted that there were conceptual differences between carry backs and
carry-overs.
24. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 381-82.
25. The Court indicated that the requirement of transferability will not be abandoned
even though no legislative intent on the requirement could be found. 382 U.S. at 383.
26. A comparison of two cases, In re Wright, 157 Fed. 544 (2d Cir. 1907), and In re
Coleman, 87 F.2d 753 (2d Cir. 1937), is interesting in this context. In the Wright case the
trustee was awarded the bankrupt's renewal commissions which were generated by pre-
bankruptcy activities but were payable after the filing of the petition. Although the right
of the bankrupt accrued in a contract executed prior to the bankruptcy, the actual commis-
sions were uncertain in amount and duration. However, the court decided it was "property"
of the bankrupt at the time of the petition. In re Wright, supra at 546-47; accord, In re Fahys,
18 F. Supp. 529 (S.D.N.Y. 1937). But see In re Leibowitt, 93 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1937), cert.
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If the loss carry-over does not vest in the trustee, there will be inequitable
results in at least some situations. The right to take a carry-over deduction re-
quires, simply, losses followed by the earning of income from which to take the
deduction. When the losses are the result of pre-bankruptcy transactions and
the post-bankruptcy income is generated by the trustee, as he may do, for
example, in arrangement proceedings, there seems to be no reason to deny the
trustee the right to lessen his tax liability by taking the deduction from income
he earned.
In other situations, the equities are more closely balanced. For example, fol-
lowing a straight bankruptcy proceeding, the bankrupt himself might generate
the income from which a carry-over deduction could be taken. The trustee could
be given a transferable right to require the bankrupt to account to him for the
value of the deduction 27 The trustee has a weaker position here than in the prior
situation, since it is the bankrupt, rather than the trustee, who has earned the
taxable income.
denied, 303 U.S. 652 (1938); Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of the United States v. Stewart, 12
F. Supp. 186 (W.DS.C. 1935).
In the Coleman case, on the other hand, the court held that the proceeds of an attorney's
contingent fee arrangement entered into prior to bankruptcy was not "property" of his
estate. In re Coleman, supra at 754; accord, In re Thomas, 204 F.2d 788, 795 (7th Cir. 1953).
In both Coleman and Wright the services which earned the "property" were rendered in
part before and in part after the iing of the petitions. However, in the former case the entire
property vested in the trustee, while in Coleman the entire property vested in the bankrupt.
The distinguishing factor between these two cases was the type of service rendered by the
bankrupt. The insurance agent renders ministerial services when renewing polities, while the
attorney renders a much more substantial service when handling a case. The bankrupt who
claims a carry-over deduction must earn taxable income before he may take the deduction.
Further, the value of the deduction is determined by the amount of income he earns. The
act of earning income would seem to be somewhat more than ministerial, but whether the
acts here would come within Coleman or Wright is an academic point since under present
law the trustee has no claim to the deduction in either event.
The principal exceptions to this general rule are the pension and vacation pay cases. In
these cases, e.g., Tennessee Valley Authority v. Kinzer, 142 F.2d 833 (6th Cir. 1944); In re
Baxter, 104 F.2d 318 (6th Cir. 1939); In re McAanaman, 50 F. Supp. 869 (ND. Inl. 1941),
the bankrupt has contributed during his employment, through salary deductions, to the com-
pany's retirement fund which is either self-funded or insured. At the time of his bankruptcy
he has a credit to the extent of his contributions plus interest. Under the usual agreement this
credit cannot be assigned or withdrawn except upon death or termination of employment.
The courts have been reluctant to invade these funds usually upon the ground that the
monies are unassignable and non-transferable. However, such a decision also reflects a policy
decision that the benefits accrued through these plans should be used solely for retirement.
The outcome of the vacation pay cases is dependent upon whether the court concludes that
the pay is earned before or after bankruptcy. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Kinzer, supra at
838.
27. Making this right transferable will avoid the problem of having to keep the estate
open for up to five, or in some rare cases, ten years during which the deduction may be
taken.
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The instant case prevented an unwarranted gain on the part of the bankrupt
at the expense of the creditors. If, in the case of a loss carry-over, the same
purpose cannot be served under the existing law, then an amendment to the
Bankruptcy Act would be in order.
Conflict of Laws--Connecticut Realty of a New York Partnership In-
cluded in the Gross Estate for Tax Purposes in New York.-Decedent and
his son, residents of New York, formed a partnership in New York for the pur-
pose of buying realty in Connecticut.' The decedent devised all his interest in
the partnership to his son. The New York court of appeals held that inasmuch
as the land was situated in Connecticut, the law of that state should control in
determining whether New York may validly include the value of the property
in decedent's gross estate subject to the New York estate tax. Upon finding that
Connecticut law did not resolve the problem,2 the court held that, since the
agreement was executed in New York, its interpretation was subject to the
New York Partnership Law which contains provisions converting partnership
realty into personalty and stipulating that on the death of a partner the property
shall pass to the surviving partner or partners as tenants in partnership.3 The
court, therefore, concluded that the realty was converted into personalty and as
such the value of the property should be included as part of the decedent's
gross estate subject to New York estate tax.4 Matter of Havemeyer, 17 N.Y.2d
216, 217 N.E.2d 26, 270 N.Y.S.2d 197 (1966).
Connecticut treated the land in question as realty rather than as personalty
for tax purposes. 5 The New York State Tax Commission, in assessing the value
of the decedent's estate, included the value of the Connecticut realty.0 Before
the New York surrogate's court, the executors contended that, since Connecticut
had taxed the land as realty, it should be excluded from the decedent's gross
1. In the Matter of Estate of Havemeyer, 42 Misc. 2d 585, 586, 248 N.Y.S.2d 412, 414
(Surr. Ct. 1964). See text accompanying note 23 infra.
2. See text accompanying notes 12-14 infra.
3. N.Y. Partnership Law § 12(1) provides: "All property originally brought into the
partnership stock or subsequently acquired, by purchase or otherwise, on account of the
partnership is partnership property." Section 51 provides: "1. A partner is co-owner with
his partners of specific partnership property holding as a tenant in partnership 2. . . . (d)
On the death of a partner his right in specific partnership property vests in the surviving
partner or partners, except where the deceased was the last surviving partner, when his right
. . . vests in his legal representative. Such surviving partner or partners, or the legal repre-
sentative of the last surviving partner, has no right to possess the partnership property for
any but a partnership purpose."
4. N.Y. Tax Law § 249-r.
5. Connecticut imposed a succession tax treating the land as realty rather than personalty.
42 Misc. 2d at 587, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 414. However, the succession tax on this estate was never
reviewed in the Connecticut courts. 17 N.Y.2d at 218, 217 N.E.2d at 27, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 199.
6. 42 Misc. 2d at 588, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 415.
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estate by virtue of New York Tax Law section 249-r as out of state realty. 7 The
Commission contended that the land was a partnership asset under New York
Partnership Law section 12,8 and that, by virtue of section 52, 9 decedent's
only interest was in personal partnership property. The court, in rejecting the
Commission's contentions, found that the partnership land passed to the son by
virtue of the devise as realty, rather than as personalty by virtue of the partner-
ship agreement. 10 The appellate division affirmed the surrogate in a memorandum
decision."
The instant court, in reversing, conceded that Connecticut law should gov-
ern. 2 Connecticut common law requires that, before partnership realty will be
converted, there must be an explicit or implicit intent to do so, evidenced either
by the acts of the partners themselves or by the language of the partnership
agreement.' 3 The court, finding no requisite intent in the acts of the partners,
looked to the agreement.' 4
The agreement which recited the terms on which capital, profits, and losses
were to be distributed was silent as to conversion of the realty into personal
property.' 5 The court, however, found that under New York law the "traditional
rule has been that matters bearing upon the execution, the interpretation and
the validity of contracts are governed by the law of the State where the con-
tract was made."' 6 The court realized the weakness of the rule by stating that
the rule is "no longer to be slavishly followed .... ,"17 Yet the court reasoned
that the rule "nevertheless still signifies that the place where a contract is made
7. 42 Misc. 2d at 587, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 415. See N.Y. Tax Law § 249-r, which provides:
"Gross Estate-The value of the gross estate of the decedent hall be determined by includ-
ing the value at the time of his death of all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible,
wherever situated (except real property situated . . . outside this state)."
8. See note 3 supra.
9. "A partner's interest in the partnership is his share of the profits and surplus and the
same is personal property." N.Y. Partnership Law § 52.
10. 42 Misc. 2d at 594, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 421-22.
11. 24 App. Div. 2d 477, 261 N.Y.S.2d 277 (2d Dep't 1965) (memorandum decision). The
dissent felt that certain acts of the decedent, such as his failure to deed the land to himself or
his partner as tenants in common, provided the requisite intent. Id. at 478, 261 N.Y.S.2d
at 277.
12. 17 N.Y.2d at 220, 217 N.E.2d at 28, 270 N.Y.52d at 201.
13. Steinmetz v. Steinmetz, 125 Conn. 663, 666-67, 7 A.2d 915, 917 (1939); Sigourney
v. Mun, 7 Conn. 11, 18 (1828).
14. 17 N.Y.2d at 221, 217 N.E.2d at 29, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 201. The acts which could be
construed as intent to convert were mentioned in the dissent in the appellate division. 24 App.
Div. 2d at 478, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 277-78. The instant court rejected them as being insufficient.
17 N.Y.2d at 221, 217 N.E.2d at 29, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 201.
15. The pertinent provisions of the partnership agreement are alluded to in the opinion
of the surrogate. 42 Misc. 2d at 586, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 414.
16. 17 N.Y.2d at 221, 217 N.E.2d at 29, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 201. The court cited for its
proposition Swift & Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 280 N.Y. 135, 19 N.E.2d 992, (1939); Union
Nat'l Bank v. Chapman, 169 N.Y. 538, 62 N.E. 672 (1902).
17. 17 N.Y.2d at 221, 217 N.E.2d at 29, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 201.
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is a signficant contact in applying the center of gravity rule of [the New York
case of] Auten v. Auten .. . ."Is Since the contract was made in New York and
was between New York domicilaries, under Auten the significant contacts were
found to be with New York. Thus, the court concluded that the partnership
agreement should be interpreted in accordance with the law of New York.10 It
was therefore held that the partnership agreement was made "subject to the
New York State Partnership Law which . ..contains express provisions con-
verting partnership real estate into personalty and providing that on death it
shall pass to the surviving partner or partners as tenants in partnership.1
20
The reasoning of the court is inconsistent with its premise that "Connecticut
law should govern inasmuch as this real property is located in Connecticut." 2' 1
Instead of applying the New York rule of Auten, the court should have inquired
into Connecticut law to determine whether, under the circumstances, Connecti-
cut would apply the lex loci contractus. Under Connecticut law, if the parties to a
contract execute it with the intention that it be performed in another state, then
the law of the state where the contract is to be performed is the law that will con-
trol the interpretation of the contract.2 2 The partnership agreement in question
recited that the partnership was formed for the purpose of "'investing in certain
real estate . . . [in Connecticut] and taking such action in connection with
the investment as may be appropriate.' ",23 In Chillingwortlh v. Eastern Tin-
ware Co.,24 where it appeared that a chattel mortgage had been executed
in New York by a New York domiciliary and a New York corporation covering
personalty located in Connecticut, the Connecticut supreme court of errors held
that "the mere fact... that the instrument was formally executed and delivered
in New York is not, of itself, decisive of the question as to what law shall con-
trol .. ."25 Since the place of performance was in Connecticut, the law of that
state was found to govern. Similarly, in McLoughlin v. Shaw, 20 where it appeared
that a trust agreement respecting Connecticut land had been made in Canada
between Canadian domiciliaries, the Connecticut court, upon finding that the
18. Ibid. In Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954), there was a separation
agreement made between husband and wife in New York. Immediately after the signing of
the agreement, the wife returned to England where both parties were domiciled, and brought
an action for support. There was a clause in the agreement that prohibited the bringing of
any matrimonial action. The court held that the significant contacts lay with England and
therefore the contract should be interpreted in accordance with the law of that Jurisdiction.
Accord, Oltarsh v. Aetna Ins. Co., 15 N.Y.2d 111, 204 N.E.2d 622, 256 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1965);
Downs v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 19 App. Div. 2d 376, 243 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1st Dep't
1963), aff'd 14 N.Y.2d 266, 200 N.E.2d 204, 251 N.Y.S.2d 19 (1964).
19. 17 N.Y.2d at 222, 217 N.E.2d at 29, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 202.
20. Id. at 221, 217 N.E.2d at 29, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 201. See note 3 supra.
21. 17 N.Y.2d at 220, 17 N.E.2d at 28, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 201.
22. Endicott Ass'n v. Thorne, 111 Conn. 697, 151 Ad. 187 (1930); H.G. Craig & Co. v.
Uncas Paperboard Co., 104 Conn. 559, 133 At. 673 (1926).
23. 42 Misc. 2d at 586, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 414.
24. 66 Conn. 306, 33 At. 1009 (1895).
25. Id. at 317, 33 At]. at 1011.
26. 95 Conn. 102, 111 AUt. 62 (1920).
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agreement was to be operative in Connecticut, held that Connecticut law should
be applied2 7 Thus it appears that if the New York court of appeals had applied the
Connecticut law concerning contract interpretation to the instant case, it would
have found that the law of the place of performance, Connecticut, rather than
the law of the place of execution, New York, would control.
Furthermore, in reaching its conclusion, the court here ignored the proposi-
tion advanced by several courts2 8 and commentatorsPO that although the
doctrine of equitable conversion may be applied for intrastate purposes, the doc-
trine is a fiction which has no place in the resolution of a question of conflict
of laws at least where the interest of the owner was, by the law of the situs, an
interest in realty. In other words, where a question of conflict of laws is to be
resolved, equitable conversion is ignored and the property is treated as realty or
personalty as determined by the law of the situs.
Professor Beale3" supports this conflict of laws concept by reasoning that
fictions arise by the operation of some particular state law, and the operation of
conflict of laws must be determined "in advance of any of the fictions created by
any particular law. . . . While equitable conversion is a fiction of law, the
question whether land shall be dealt with as . . . personalty is not . . . [and
therefore should be] governed by the law of the state of the situs of the land.131
The present court, relying on Blodgett v. Silberman,am found that taxation by
both New York and Connecticut was not unconstitutional since the land was
taxed as realty in Connecticut and as personalty in New York. Notwithstanding
the constitutionality of double taxation, the result, as Judge Keating noted in
his concurring opinion, was "manifestly inequitable." 33 However he felt there
27. Id. at 106, 111 At. at 64.
28. Equitable Trust Co. v. Ward, 29 Del. Ch. 206, 48 A.2d 519 (Ch. 1946); Toledo Soc'y
for Crippled Children v. Hickok, 152 Tex. 578, 261 S.W.2d 692, cert. denied, 347 U.S. 936
(1954). See Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U.S. 186 (1900); Pond v. Porter, 141 Conn. 56, 104 A.2d
228 (1954) ; Trowbridge v. Metcalf, 5 App. Div. 318, 39 N.Y.S. 241 (1st Dep't 1896), affd
mern., 158 N.Y. 682, 52 N.E. 1126 (1899); In re Good's Estate, 96 N.Y.S.2d 798 (Surr. Ct.
1950), aff'd mem, 278 App. Div. 806, 104 N.Y.S.2d 804 (Ist Dep't 1951), aff'd, 304 N.Y.
110, 106 N.E.2d 36 (1952).
29. 2 Beale, Conflict of Laws § 209.1 (1935); Leflar, Conflict of Laws § 141, 273 (1959);
Stimson, Conflict of Laws 156-57 (1963); Stumberg, Conflict of Laws 371 (3d ed. 1963).
There is an apparent trend that although "there may be a conversion of local land for intra-
state purposes, there can be no conversion for Conflict of Laws purposes." Leflar, op. cit.
supra.
30. 2 Beale, Conflict of Laws § 209.1 (1935).
31. Ibid.
32. 277 U.S. 1 (1928). In that case, the Court permitted Connecticut to tax as intangible
personal property a decedent's interest in a partnership which held New York realty. The
Court dismissed the fact that the property was also taxable in another jurisdiction as irrele-
vant and found that "it suffices that intangible personalty has such a situs at the domicil of
its owner that its transfer on his death may be taxed there." Id. at 10. (Emphasis omitted.)
See also State Tax Comm'r v. Aldrich, 316 US. 174 (1942); Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 US.
473 (1925).
33. 17 N.Y.2d at 224, 217 N.E.2d at 30, 270 N.YS.2d at 203.
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"just seems to be no way to wriggle out of the ... result. ' '34 The inequity of
double taxation could have been avoided had the present court subscribed to
the acceptable rule that the fiction of equitable conversion has no place in con-
flict of laws35 or had the court applied the law of Connecticut in its entirety.
Constitutional Law--Commerce and Supremacy Clauses Exempt Profes-
sional Baseball from State Antitrust Statute.-The state of Wisconsin insti-
tuted action against the defendants' to enforce a state antitrust statute.2 The
circuit court for Milwaukee County determined that the defendants' decision to
transfer the Milwaukee Braves baseball team to Atlanta, Georgia, and their
refusal to issue a replacement franchise, was an unreasonable exercise of monop-
olistic control and violative of Wisconsin Statute.8 The court entered judg-
ment 4 awarding the state recovery of damages5 and injunctive relief.0 The
supreme court of Wisconsin admitted that there was a violation of the state
statute,7 but determined that the statute could not be applied because to do so
would violate the supremacy and commerce clauses of the United States Con-
stitution.8 State v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc., 30 Wis. 2d -, 144 N.W.2d 1 (1966).
The commerce clause does not expressly exclude state regulation of commerce
and thus there has been difficulty in determining the extent to which a state can
legislate in the field of interstate commerce. 9 In Gibbons v. Ogden'° the Court
first said that the states have no authority to substantially impede interstate
34. Ibid.
35. New York perhaps does not subscribe to this rule. See Hope v. Brewer, 136 N.Y.
126, 32 N.E. 558 (1892), where the New York court of appeals, in a conflict of laws problem,
held that realty situated in Scotland was deemed to have been equitably converted.
1. Defendants were the National League and the corporate owners of the ten National
League baseball teams.
2. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 133.01 (Supp. 1966).
3. State v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. (1966 Trade Cas.) 11 71738 (Wis.
Cir. Ct. April 13, 1966) (memorandum decision). The team had a high attendance record
and thus sizeable profits. Furthermore the potential financial loss to the community was
substantial. Therefore the court categorized the move by the team to Atlanta as unreason-
able. See note 40 infra.
4. Trade Reg. Rep. fI 71738, at 82411.
5. In the trial court, the state of Wisconsin was awarded recovery of $5,000 plus costs
and disbursements against each defendant. Trade Reg. Rep. If 71738, at 82412.
6. The Milwaukee Braves Baseball Club, Inc. was enjoined from playing home games
elsewhere than in Milwaukee County Stadium unless a franchise for a new team was granted
to the County of Milwaukee in 1967. Id. at 82411-12.
7. 30 Wis. 2d. at -, 144 N.W.2d at 11.
8. Id. at-, 144 N.W.2d at 17-18.
9. For pre-1932 decisions which held state laws to be invalid because of the commerce
clause see Gavit, The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution 551-56 (1932).
See also Corwin, The Commerce Power Versus States Rights (1936); Pritchett, American
Constitutional Issues 200 (1932); Stern, The Problems of Yesteryear-Commerce and Due
Process, 4 Vand. L. Rev. 446 (1951).
10. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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commerce when a need for national uniformity of regulation can be shown. The
classic test for determining whether an activity requires national uniform regula-
tion or local control was stated in Cooley v. Board of Wardens," which dealt
with the validity of state laws in the regulation of river pilots. The Court said:
Now the power to regulate commerce, embraces a vast field, containing not only many,
but exceedingly various subjects, quite unlike in their nature; some imperatively de-
manding a single uniform rule, operating equally on the commerce of the United
States in every port; and some, like the subject now in question, as imperatively de-
manding that diversity, which alone can meet the local necessities of navigation....
Whatever subjects of this power are in their nature national, or admit only of one
uniform system... may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive
legislation by Congress.12
Thus a lack of legislation by Congress in an area of interstate commerce
does not allow unlimited legislation by each individual state13 if it can be shown
that such local legislation would substantially impede interstate commerce. It
was further determined, in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona,14 that a state legisla-
ture could not determine in each individual case whether a national interest re-
quiring uniform federal legislation or a local interest requiring state regulation
was involved. Rather the courts15 were found to be the proper vehicle for
determining the propriety of state legislation in the hazy area between national
and local interests in commerce.
Before choosing between national and local interests, the instant court held
that the business of professional baseball is interstate in nature."" Baseball was
originally held not to be interstate activity by the Supreme Court in Federal
Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs.17 The Court stated that, although professional baseball necessarily in-
volves repeated travel of players between different states, the transport was "a
mere incident, not the essential thing,"' 8 and thus no interstate commerce was
involved. "Although . . . subsequent decisions . . . under the commerce clause
11. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
12. Id. at 318-19.
13. See, e.g., Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 386 (1946) (Black, J., concurring);
Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 784 (1945) (Black, 3., dissenting). It was
originally the theory of Chief Justice Taney that Congress, and not the courts, should decide
if state legislation was invalidated by the commerce clause. For Taney's views se Frankfurter,
The Commerce Clause Under Marshall, Taney and Waite (1937); Dowling, Interstate Com-
merce and State Power, 27 Va. L. Rev. 1 (1940).
14. 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
15. In ruling that an Arizona statute which limited the number of railroad cars per train
was invalid, the Court stated: "the commerce clause, without the aid of Congressional legis-
lation, thus affords some protection from state legislation inimical to the national commerce,
and that in such cases, where Congress has not acted, this Court, and not the state legislature,
is under the commerce clause the final arbiter of the competing demands of state and
national interests." Id. at 769.
16. 30 Vis. 2d at-, 144 N.W.2d at 11.
17. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
18. Id. at 209.
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and expansion of baseball's activities since 1922 °1 indicated that the business
might indeed be considered to be involved in interstate commerce, the Court, in
Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc.,20 refused to re-examine its Federal Baseball
holding. There the Court avoided the interstate commerce issue by stating that
Federal Baseball determined "that Congress had no intention of including the
business of baseball within the scope of the federal antitrust laws."21 The Court
indicated that the decision was based upon the fact that the business had de-
veloped for thirty years on an understanding of exemption, and that it felt that
Congress should be the one to change the rule as legislation would have only
prospective effect.22 Congress has recognized that the sport is an interstate activ-
ity2 3 and several courts have indicated the interstate nature by stating that the
sport should be regulated by Congress. 24 The problem of whether a sport can be
considered trade or commerce has been surmounted whenever it was proved that
the clubs, as an integral part of their business, sell nationwide entertainment
and make substantial profits from radio and television transmission. 25 Certainly
this is true for baseball, and the Court was correct in finding the industry to be
interstate commerce.
The court here concluded that the business of baseball required "uniformity
of regulation, and since organized baseball operates widely in interstate com-
merce, the regulation, if there is to be any, must be prescribed by Congress,"2
since the Toolson decision barred federal action under existing federal antitrust
statutes. The correct, although anomalous, result is obvious. The Toolson de-
cision was based upon Federal Baseball which held that baseball was not inter-
state commerce. The instant court has rejected the rational of Federal Baseball
yet necessarily has used Toolson to bar prosecution under federal legislation.
The proponents for baseball's cause in 1922 used the local argument to bar
19. The Supreme Court, 1953 Term, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 96, 136 (1954). (Footnote omitted.)
20. 346 U.S. 356 (1953). "The present cases ask us to overrule the prior decision [Federal
Baseball] . . .without re-examination of the underlying issues, the judgments below are
affirmed on the authority of Federal Baseball ..... Id. at 357.
21. Ibid. This decision has been criticized because Federal Baseball was not decided on
the ground of congressional intent but rather on the fact that baseball did not constitute
interstate commerce. It seems clear that although in 1953 baseball did constitute interstate
commerce, the Court was attempting to avoid a ruling which would subject the sport to
prosecution under federal antitrust statutes. See Eckler, Baseball-Sport or Commerce?, 17
U. Chi. L. Rev. 56 (1949); Neville, Baseball and the Antitrust Laws, 16 Fordham L. Rev.
208 (1947); The Supreme Court, 1953 Term, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 96, 136 (1954); Note, 53
Colum. L. Rev. 242 (1953); 25 Miss. L.J. 270 (1954); 22 U. Kan. City L. Rev. 173 (1954).
22. 346 U.S. at 357.
23. Subcomm. on the Study of Monopoly Power of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
Organized Baseball, H. R. Rep. No. 2002, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 4, 7, 111-39 (1952).
24. Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 452 (1957); United States v.
International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236, 242-43 (1955) ; United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S.
222, 230 (1955).
25. Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 449 (1957); United States v.
International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236, 240-43 (1955).
26. 30 Wis. 2d at-, 114 N.W.2d at 18. (Footnote omitted.)
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federal antitrust prosecution. 27 Now the reverse argument, that baseball is in-
terstate commerce, has been sucessfully used to avoid a state antitrust suit
creating a void in which baseball is free of all antitrust prosecution until Con-
gress wishes to act.
Judge Fairchild, writing for the majority, proposed that the supremacy clause,
and not the commerce clause, of the Constitution provides an appropriate
rational for his decision that the state statute is inapplicable.as He reasoned
that congressional silence in the face of Supreme Court decisions exempting
baseball from federal antitrust legislation29 did not create a vacuum in which
states could regulate baseball but was, rather, equivalent to a positive declara-
tion of congressional intent that baseball should be exempt from any such
legislation and that this federal policy preempted state prosecution of the sport
under a state antitrust statute.
Must it follow that a lack of legislation in the face of calls for such legislation
indicates a congressional intent that there should be no regulation at all? In
Helvering v. Hallock3° the Court indicated that to consider the nonaction of
Congress as controlling was to "venture into speculative unrealities."' In FTC
v. Dean Foods Co.,- it was shown that the Federal Trade Commission had
sought authority from Congress to grant preliminary injunctions. Congress did
not take action. The Court stated that "we cannot infer from the fact that
Congress took no action at all... that Congress thereby expressed an intent to
circumscribe traditional judicial remedies." 33 However, the argument of the dis-
sent that preemption cannot be granted in the face of congressional silence alone
is equally questionable. 34 Many cases hold to the contrary that preemption will
be granted even though no specific congressional legislation has been enacted.35
The problem with the majority's preemption reasoning is that it has con-
centrated on the unsound contention that intent can be shown by acquiesence
in court decisions. The test of congressional intent is not based upon the intent
of any particular Congress but rather consistency with the overall structure of
27. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
28. 30 Wis. 2d at-, 144 N.W.2d at 16-18.
29. 30 Wis. 2d at-, 144 N.W.2d at 13-15; accord, Radovich v. National Football Lea-
gue, 352 U.S. 445 (1957) ; United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955) ;
United States v. Shubert 348 US. 222 (1955); Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc, 346 U.S.
356 (1953); Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional
Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
30. 309 U.S. 106 (1940).
31. Id. at 120. (Footnote omitted.)
32. 384 US. 597 (1966).
33. Id. at 609-10.
34. 30 Wis. 2d at-, 144 N.W.2d at 20.
35. California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 728-29 (1949); Graves v. New York ex rel.
O'Keefe, 306 US. 466, 479 (1939); Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154
U.S. 204, 212 (1894); In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 559-60 (1891); Bowman v. Chicago &
Northwestern Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 481-82 (1888); Brown v. Houston, 114 U.S. 622, 631-32
(1885).
1966] CASE NOTES
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
congressional action 30 and, more importantly, is similar to that used in the
commerce clause cases37 -whether a uniform national rule is required to keep
unhampered the flow of interstate commerce.A8 If uniformity of regulation is
necessary, state action which interferes with such a result will be invalidated.
What are the factors weighed each time the court must determine if state
legislation has been preempted by federal necessity for uniform rules? Several
broad tests have been suggested,39 but ultimately each case must be determined
on its particular facts alone. The state here argued that it would lose millions of
dollars in trade and that it must be able to protect itself from unreasonable
4 0
monopolistic 41 practices. But weighed against this is the type of relief sought by
the state. It was admitted that the result of a finding for the state would require
the league to admit a new franchise, 42 thus necessitating an expansion of the
league structure. This would result in expanded schedules and a partial deple-
tion of the present team rosters in order to fill the manpower needs of the new
team. If Wisconsin were successful, what would prevent other cities in other
states of comparable demographic and economic characteristics from suing
36. Ribble, State and National Power Over Commerce 212 (1937).
37. See generally Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction,
12 Stan. L. Rev. 208 (1959). "The Court has adopted the same weighing of interests ap-
proach in pre-emption cases that it uses to determine whether a state law unjustifiably bur-
dens interstate commerce." Id. at 220.
38. California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 728 (1949).
39. Flynn, Federalism and State Antitrust Regulation 80-82 (1964). Factors which are
considered in determining whether a uniform national rule should be imposed are: "the
degree to which the state regulation interferes, delays, interrupts, and inconveniences the free
flow of interstate commerce; the high financial cost involved in complying with the state
regulation; whether the subject matter of the regulation is one where uniformity of regula-
tion is required for the free flow of commerce among the states; and the possibility of double
prosecutions based upon the same acts." Id. at 80-81. (Footnotes omitted.)
40. The move was considered unreasonable because during the period from 1953 through
1965 the home paid attendance was second highest in both major leagues averaging over 1.5
million per year, or 31% more than the average attendance level in the National League and
52% higher than the American League. It was found that if proper bookkeeping methods had
been utilized, the team would have shown high profits from 1953 through 1964. 30 Wis. 2d
at-, 144 N.W.2d at 6. Damages to the Milwaukee area were substantial; one witness testified
the economic benefit to the city amounted to $18,000,000 annually. Id. at -, 144 N.W.2d at
22 n.l. Over the period 1953-65, the Braves paid Milwaukee County $2,800,000 rent;
the County earned $1,600,000 in parking fees; the Braves payroll was $17,600,000 and the
team purchased $5,500,000 of perishables for resale at the games. It was estimated the Braves
had brought in $50,000,000 of out-of-town revenue to the city between 1953-63. Petition for
writ or certiorari, p. 11 n.9, Wisconsin v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc., petition for cert. filed 35
U.S.L. Week 3141 (U.S. Oct. 11, 1966) (No. 659).
41. See American League Baseball Club v. Chase, 86 Misc. 441, 149 N.Y. Supp. 6 (Sup.
Ct. 1914).
42. The Court held that to require the Braves to be returned from Atlanta without ex-
pansion would be inconsistent with antitrust policies because it would preserve the monopoly
at Atlanta's expense. Expansion of the league thus was the only feasible relief under the
lower court's injunction. 30 Wis. 2d at-, 144 N.W.2d at 12.
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under similar or other types of state regulatory legislation? This would affect not
only those aspects of the sport within their borders but also the other league
members in other states.
43
The instant court was correct in determining that the danger to the industry
is greater than the damage to the state and that state prosecution should be
struck down in the interests of national unity of regulation. Since it seems un-
likely that the Toolson decision will be overruled, 44 there is a void in the regu-
lation of baseball. It is suggested that if baseball should be exempt from all
existing antitrust legislation, Congress should legislate to that effect or in some
other manner to prevent further litigation on the point.
Constitutional Law-New York "Stop and Frisk" Law-Seizure of Bur-
glar's Tools and Narcotics Without Probable Cause for Arrest or Search
Held Valid.-The New York court of appeals recently decided two cases
which represent that court's first effort to apply the provisions of section 180-a
of the Code of Criminal Procedure.1 In one, the defendant and a companion
were observed tiptoeing in the sixth floor hallway of an apartment building by
a resident off-duty policeman. As he emerged from his door with gun in hand,
the two men quickly departed by the stairs. The officer apprehended the de-
fendant on the stairs, frisked him, and, feeling a hard object, removed an
opaque plastic envelope from his pocket. Upon further examination, the en-
velope was found to contain burglar's tools. The county court denied defendant's
motion to suppress these articles; 2 the appellate division3 and the court of
43. The dissent also argued, using Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), that state regu-
lation should be upheld where because of the practical difficulties involved, the subject "'may
never be adequately dealt with by Congress.'" 30 Wis. 2d at-, 144 N.W2d at 23. (Emphasis
added.) However, there is no reason why Congress cannot pass legislation requiring manage-
ment to be reasonable in its exercise of the monopoly.
44. Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957). Discussing the baseball
exemption and declining to overrule cases holding such, "we, therefore, conclude that the
orderly way to eliminate error or discrimination, if any there be, is by legislation and not by
court decision." Id. at 452.
1. "1. A police officer may stop any person abroad in a public place whom he reasonably
suspects is committing, has committed or is about to commit a felony or any of the crimes
specified in section five hundred fifty-two of this chapter, and may demand of him his name,
address and an explanation of his actions.
"2. When a police officer has stopped a person for questioning pursuant to this section and
reasonably suspects that he is in danger of life or limb, he may search such person for a
dangerous weapon. If the police officer finds such a weapon or any other thing the possession
of which may constitute a crime, he may take and keep it until the completion of the ques-
tioning, at which time he shall either return it, if lawfully possessed, or arrest such person."
N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 180-a.
2. People v. Peters, 44 Misc. 2d 470, 254 N.Y.S.2d 10 (Westchester County CL 1964).
3. People v. Peters, 24 App. Div. 2d 989, 265 N.Y.S.2d 612 (2d Dep't 1965) (memorandum
decision).
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appeals affirmed. People v. Peters, 18 N.Y.2d 238, 219 N.E.2d 595, 273 N.Y.S.2d
217 (1966).
In the second case, the defendant was observed by the arresting officer from
four o'clock in the afternoon until midnight conversing with six or eight persons
who by their own previous admissions to the officer were drug addicts. At mid-
night, the officer observed the defendant sitting in a restaurant speaking with
two or three more drug addicts. On the sole basis of these observations, the officer
requested the defendant to step out into the street for a moment. As the
officer was questioning him, the defendant "mumbled" something and reached
into his coat pocket. The officer intercepted his hand and removed a tin foil
wrapped package which, upon further examination, was found to contain ten
glassine envelopes of heroin. The trial court denied defendant's motion to sup-
press; the appellate term and the court of appeals affirmed.4 People v. Sibron,
18 N.Y.2d 603, 219 N.E.2d 196, 272 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1966) (memorandum
decision).
Section 180-a authorizes a police officer to "stop" a person in a public place
for limited questioning when the officer "reasonably suspects" 5 that the person
has committed, is committing, or is about to commit certain specified crimes.
This language has been challenged0 as a possible violation of the New York
and federal constitutional protections against unreasonable seizure of one's
person. Traditionally, this protection has meant that a police officer may not
arrest a person unless he has "probable cause"'7 for "believing" that a crime is
being or has been committed.8 Discussions of section 180-a have questioned
whether the stopping authorized by the statute is equivalent to an arrest, and,
therefore, unconstitutional because it permits an "arrest" on less than probable
cause.
4. In the trial court, at a hearing conducted on the motion to suppress, the court found
that there was probable cause for arrest and held the search and seizure valid as incidental
to a valid arrest. The appellate term and the court of appeals affirmed without opinion. How-
ever, the prosecution brief in the latter as much as conceded the absence of probable cause,
and Justice Van Voorhis' dissenting opinion indicated that the conviction was affirmed on
the basis of N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 180-a. 18 N.Y.2d at 604-05, 219 N.E.2d at 197, 272
IN.Y.S.2d at 376.
5. In People v. Peters, reasonable suspicion was defined vaguely as "somewhat below prob.
able cause on the scale of absolute knowledge of criminal activity." 18 N.Y.2d at 245, 219
N.E.2d at 599, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 222. The court made no attempt to provide any general stan-
dards for deciding how much less than probable cause will be accepted as reasonable suspicion.
Adding to this uncertainty, the court stated that "the statute incorporates the experienced
police officer's intuitive knowledge and appraisal of the appearances of criminal activity."
Ibid.
6. See, e.g., Comment, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 848, 856-59 (1965) ; Note, 78 Hary. L. Rev. 473,
474-75 (1964).
7. Probable cause has been defined as facts and circumstances known to the arresting
officer which would warrant a prudent and cautious man to believe that a crime has been or
is being committed. Henry v. United States, 361 US. 98, 102 (1959) ; United States v. DI Re,
332 U.S. 581, 592 (1948).
8. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 36-37 (1963); United States v. Di Re, supra note 7.
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Much of this discussion has concentrated on two fairly recent Supreme Court
decisions in which police officers stopped vehicles, but did not have probable
cause to arrest the occupants at that time. In Henry v. United States, two FBI
agents were investigating a theft of whiskey from an interstate shipment.
They had defendant's companion under surveillance because of information of
an undisclosed nature linking the companion to the theft. The officers twice
observed the men loading cartons into a car in an alley in a residential area.
Although the officers could not determine whether the cartons were part of the
stolen shipment, they followed the car and waved the men to a stop. They
searched the car and took the men to their office. Two hours later, they learned
that the cartons contained stolen radios and placed the men under formal
arrest. For unknown reasons, the government conceded that the arrest occurred
when the officers stopped the car. Without any explanation of its reasons, the
Court agreed that, on the facts of this particular case, the arrest occurred when
the officers stopped the car. The Court then held that there was no probable
cause for the arrest and that the search of the car and the seizure of the cartons
were illegal.
In Rios v. United States,'0 two officers observed a taxicab parked in a vacant
lot next to an apartment house in a neighborhood with a high incidence of
narcotics activity. The defendant came out of the building and entered the
cab. The officers followed the cab for two miles. When it stopped for a red
light, they left their car and approached the cab. The testimony of the various
parties disagreed on the sequence of the actions which followed. The cab door
was opened; the defendant emerged from the cab; one officer grabbed the
defendant by the arm and drew his revolver. The defendant dropped a recogniz-
able package of narcotics. During the occurrence of these events, the traffic light
had changed to green. The Court remanded the case to the district court to
determine at what moment the arrest occurred. No guidelines were provided
for making this determination, nor was any attempt made to distinguish the
case from Henry on the basis that the cab in Rios was already stopped for
a red light.
A careful examination of the two cases shows that the Supreme Court has not
attempted to lay down a specific definition of "arrest." At the time the officers
approached the cab in Rios, there was no probable cause for arrest. Therefore,
if Henry had provided a general rule that any stopping constituted an arrest,
the Court should have held that the stopping of the cab in Rios was an illegal
arrest." Contrasted with this absence of a square holding in the Supreme Court,
New York,' 2 several other states,' 3 and federal courts in the Second Circuit'4 have
9. 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
10. 364U.S. 253 (1960).
11. Leagre, The Fourth Amendment and the Law of Arrest, 54 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 393,
395 (1963). The author goes further and argues that these two decisions imply a definite
power of the police to detain on less than probable cause for limited investigation. Ibid.
12. People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E.2d 32, 252 N.YS.2d 458 (1964), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 978 (1965); People v. Entrialgo, 19 App. Div. 2d 509, 245 N.YS.2d 850 (2d Dep't
1963), aff'd mem., 14 N.Y.2d 733, 199 N.E.2d 384, 250 N.Y.S.2d 293 (1964). The court of
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held that a police officer may temporarily detain a person for questioning on
less than probable cause. However, no court has yet provided a comprehensive
test for determining when a person may be detained on less than probable cause.
One specific test suggested for applying section 180-a is that it be limited,
generally, to situations in which only one more detail of description or connection
with the crime would be needed for probable cause to arrest or where only an
overt act would be needed to constitute an attempt. 1 In addition, the suggested
test proposes that the police should not be allowed to use a weapon in detaining
the suspect. 16 It is submitted that this test is too rigid. It does not consider
the seriousness of the crime being investigated in determining what are reason-
able grounds for suspicion. Further, the test does not provide for the use of
different degrees of force or restraint depending on the nature of the suspected
crime and the weight of the grounds for suspicion. Finally, this test would
substantially vitiate the purpose of the statute-to "prevent crime" by "prompt
inquiry into suspicious or unusual street action"--where the police are not
investigating a particular crime.' 7 The need for such protection today in
metropolitan areas requires no documentation.
It is suggested that a more flexible standard can prevent unreasonable de-
tentions and nevertheless protect society against criminal depredations. In each
case the courts should carefully analyze the nature of the detention"8 and the
appeals based its decision in Peters on People v. Rivera, supra, as well as on § 180-a. However,
Rivera involved the seizure of a weapon as the result of a frisk on less than probable cause.
There are no prior decisions involving seizure of contraband other than a weapon when a sus-
pect was detained on less than probable cause.
13. Ronayne, The Right to Investigate and New York's "Stop and Frisk" Law, 33 Ford-
ham L. Rev. 211, 215-22 (1964); Comment, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 848, 851-56 (1965).
14. United States v. Lewis, 362 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1966) ; United States v. Vita, 294 F.2d
524 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 823 (1962); United States v. Thomas, 250 F. Supp.
771 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); United States v. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. United States v. Bufalino, 285 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1960). The Thomas case
contains a comprehensive discussion of the various arguments concerning detention on less
than probable cause. 250 F. Supp. at 779-82. The court concluded that the constitutionality of
a particular detention should be determined by whether the detention was reasonable under
the circumstances, id. at 780, and "that a stop does not ipso facto by reason of some mechani-
cal formula constitute an arrest . . . ." Id. at 782.
15. For example, an officer investigating a purse snatching sees a man hurrying down the
street with a purse in his hand. If the man meets the victim's description in all particulars
except height, there would not be probable cause for arrest. Since only one detail of the
description is inaccurate, there would be reasonable grounds for suspicion.
16. This test is suggested in Note, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 473, 476 (1964).
17. People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d at 444-45, 201 N.E.2d at 34, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 461. See gen-
erally Leagre, supra note 11, at 413.
18. Although the cases dealing with the right to detain on less than probable cause have
not analyzed the amount of force or restraint which may be used for this purpose, the lat-
ter would seem to be of critical importance in view of the recent decision in Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Although it is true that the Supreme Court was primarily con-
cerned in that case with in-custody interrogation, the emphasis placed on the physical and
psychological pressures used in such proceedings, id. at 445-58, is indicative of the attitude the
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grounds for suspicion. The duration of the detention and the amount of force
used in restraining the suspect should be weighed against the factors supporting
the officer's suspicion. The more serious the crime suspected and the stronger
the grounds for suspicion, the more force the officer should be allowed to use
in apprehending and restraining the suspect. As a starting point, the court
might begin with the concepts of probable cause and arrest. The closer a
particular restraint approaches an arrest,' 9 the closer the grounds for suspicion
must approach probable cause. Thus, the same grounds for suspicion may
exist in two cases. Depending on the nature of the detention, one may be upheld
while the other is struck down as unreasonable. The way in which such a rule
would operate may be illustrated by comparing the detentions in the instant
cases.
In Sibron, the officer observed defendant conversing with at least eight known
drug addicts over a period of eight hours. The officer would most likely have
had probable cause for arrest if he had seen money exchanged during these
conversations.20 In any event, the officer merely requested the defendant to
step outside for a moment. The defendant complied without hesitation and
without any compulsion by the officer. There is no indication that the officer
would have used any force or restraint had the defendant refused to go outside
with him. There is no evidence of harassment since the officer and the defendant
were unknown to each other and had had no previous contacts. Weighing this
minimal intrusion against the defendant's association with known drug addicts
over a period of eight hours, the restriction, if any, on the defendant's liberty
appears reasonable.2-1
In Peters there was considerably more coercion than in Sibron22 and, there-
present Court will bring to a consideration of § 180-a and the entire question of detention on
less than probable cause. Certainly, the Court will not give the police a free hand in the
streets after providing strict guidelines for the station house.
19. The difficulty, of course, is the lack of a definition of arrest. Even the briefest stopping
on the street under authority of § 180-a is a total restraint for at least that moment.
However, common sense would seem to dictate different justifications for restraints which are
clearly distinguishable on the basis of duration and the amount of coercion employed. While
the right to remove a suspect to the station house for questioning may require probable
cause, the right to question a suspect on a public street should require less.
20. In People v. White, 16 N.Y.2d 270, 213 N.E.2d 438, 266 N.Y.S.2d 100 (1965), a police
officer observed a known drug addict with money in his hand speaking to a suspected drug
peddler. The officer was looking for the suspected drug peddler on the basis of information
from another drug addict. As the officer approached, the addict pocketed his money and
hurried away. The officer arrested the drug peddler, searched him and found narcotics. Con-
ceding that it may have been a close case, the court of appeals held that there was probable
cause for arrest without any evidence of the information obtained from the informer. Id. at
273, 213 N.E.2d at 440, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 102.
21. Although justice Van Voorhis strongly dissented on the basis of the search and seizure
issue, he conceded that the stopping may have been reasonable pursuant to § 180-a. 18 N.Y2d
at 604-05, 219 N.E.2d at 197, 272 N.YS.2d at 376.
22. Unless the officer's mere request to step outside can be considered coercion, there was
no coercion at all in Sibron.
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fore, under the rule suggested above, there should have been stronger grounds for
suspicion to support the detention. The officer grasped the fleeing defendant
by the shirt collar and questioned him at gunpoint. Although dressed in civilian
clothes, the officer did not identify himself as a policeman. He continued to
hold the defendant by the collar as he questioned him. Certainly, if this was
not an arrest, it was the ultimate restraint short of an arrest.23
The grounds for suspicion in Peters were threefold: the officer, a twelve-year
resident of the building, did not recognize the defendant and his companion; the
men were tiptoeing; and they rapidly exited by the stairs rather than the elevator
when the officer opened the door of his apartment. The first ground is substan-
tially weakened by the fact that the building housed about 120 families who
presumably had relatives and friends.24 It is not surprising that someone un-
known to the officer might be in the building. Defendant's tiptoeing was suspi-
cious. His flight was ambiguous.25 The defendant claimed he had come to visit
a girlfriend whom he refused to identify because she was a married woman. If
this were true-and the prosecution did not prove otherwise-hasty retreat may
have been in order, especially if the defendant observed the gun in the officer's
hand.
In any event, while the defendant's conduct in Peters may have been suffi-
ciently suspicious to have permitted some inquiry, the amount of force and
23. Instructions to Members of the Force Concerning the "Stop and Frisk" (chap. 86)
and "No Knock" (chap. 85) Laws, Police Dep't Cir. No. 25 (June 26, 1964) (citations are to
pages of mimeographed reproduction of original circular). The guidelines for the exercise of
the authority conferred by § 180-a clearly provide that an officer not in uniform must
promptly identify himself to the person stopped, id. at 2, and that no questions are to be
asked until the officer has identified himself. Id. at 4. Further, the officer may not use a weapon
in any fashion unless he is assaulted or there are circumstances to justify an arrest. Id. at
2-3. Even if the suspect attempts to flee after he has been stopped, the officer may not use a
weapon unless he reasonably believes (not suspects) that the suspect has committed a felony.
Id. at 5. While it should be conceded that the police wish to be officially conservative in esti-
mating their powers under § 180-a, closer adherence to these guidelines than there was in
Peters will better preserve § 180-a from constitutional attack.
24. Brief for ACLU as Amicus Curiae, p. 2, People v. Peters, 18 N.Y.2d 238, 219 N.E.2d
595, 273 N.Y.S.2d 217 (1966).
25. In Green v. United States, 259 F.2d 180 (D.C. Cir. 1958), two narcotics officers In
plainclothes in an unmarked car observed a known drug addict walking with an unknown
companion. Merely seeking information, the officers beckoned to the two men. As the addict
approached the car, his companion fled up the stairs of a nearby building and attempted to
force open the locked door of an apartment. The officers arrested the defendant for attempted
unlawful entry. The court found probable cause for arrest and observed that "'it is to-day
universally conceded that the fact of an accused's flight ... and related conduct, are admis-
sible as evidence of consciousness of guilt, and thus of guilt itself.'" Id. at 182, quoting from
2 Wigmore, Evidence § 276 (3d ed. 1940). In Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963),
the Court refused to accept the proposition that "vague suspicion could be transformed Into
probable cause for arrest by reason of ambiguous conduct [flight] which the arresting officers
themselves have provoked." Id. at 484.
intimidation used seems excessive. Certainly, the instant case must be the ex-
treme limit of "stopping" authorized by the statute.26
Assuming, arguendo, that the stopping or detention in the instant cases was
valid, did the officer have the right to "search" the suspects? Section 180-a(2)
provides that "when a police officer has stopped a person . .. and reasonably
suspects ... danger of life or limb, he may search... for a dangerous weapon."
In People v. Rivera,27 the court of appeals upheld the right of policemen to
"frisk" suspects for dangerous weapons "upon grounds of elemental safety and
precaution" in the absence of statutory authority.2 8
The defendants seized upon the word "search" and claimed that the statute
is unconstitutional on its face.29 In the absence of consent or a search warrant,
a search is allowed only if incidental to a valid arrest upon probable cause.?
Supporters of the statute claim that it authorizes only a frisk, which they define
as "a patting down for bulky objects that may be guns or knives, followed by a
reaching into clothing or a turning out of pockets only when such solid bulges have
been located." 3 ' Several other states have endorsed this practice,3 2 but the
federal courts have not yet squarely faced the problem. 3 If a policeman may
detain a person for questioning, it seems reasonable to allow him to take min-
imum precautions to protect himself.34 It has been suggested that the only satis-
factory alternative to the frisk is to approach the suspect with drawn guns.m
26. As in Sibron, the dissenting opinion in Peters (written by judge Fuld) was aimed
solely at the question of search and seizure. The detention issue was not even considered.
27. 14 N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E.2d 32, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 978
(1965).
28. Id. at 447, 201 N.E.2d at 35-36, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 463-64. Peters advanced the same
justification for the right of the officer to frisk. 18 N.Y.2d at 243, 219 N.E.2d at 598, 273
N.Y.S.2d at 221.
29. Brief for Defendant-Appellant, pp. 23-27, People v. Sibron, 18 N.Y.2d 603, 219
N.E.2d 196, 272 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1966) ; Brief for Defendant-Appellant, p. 11, People v. Peters,
24 App. Div. 2d 989, 265 N.Y.S.2d 612 (2d Dep't 1965) (memorandum decision).
30. Henry v. United States, 361 US. 98 (1959); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581
(1948).
31. Kuh, New York Stop and Frisk Law, N.Y.L.J., May 29, 1964, p. 4, col. 3. Accord,
People v. Peters, 18 N.Y.2d at 245, 219 N.E.2d at 599, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 233; People v. Rivera,
14 N.Y.2d at 446, 201 N.E.2d at 35, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 463. Instructions, op. cit. supra note 23,
at 6.
32. Comnent, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 848, 859-61 (1965).
33. A frisk has occurred in several cases in the federal courts, but the decisions turned
on other aspects of the cases, and the courts did not reach the question of the legality of a
patting down or frisk in the absence of probable cause. Eg., United States v. Di Re, 332
U.S. 581 (1948); Ellis v. United States, 264 F.2d 372 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 359 US. 998
(1959) ; White v. United States, 271 F.2d 829 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
34. Bristow, Police Officer Shootings-A Tactical Evaluation, 54 3. Crim. L, C. & P-S.
93, 94-95 (1963). In 56 cases of injuries to police officers questioning suspects in buildings,
19% of the injuries were the direct result of the officer's failure to adequately search the
suspects for weapons. Ibid.
35. Ronayne, supra note 13, at 237.
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This would appear to be a more serious intrusion on a person's liberty80 than a
rapid patting of one's clothing, and it is more likely to result in a court's finding
that an arrest was made.37
In Peters, the officer was alone on the stairs with the defendant; his com-
panion was possibly still in the building. The officer patted the defendant's
clothing and, feeling a hard object, removed the plastic envelope from the de-
fendant's pocket. There was no further search of the defendant's person. In
Sibron, the suspect reached into his pocket. The officer simultaneously reached
into the pocket and removed the package. No further search of defendant's
person was made. The limited "searches" in the instant cases, up to this point,
do not seem unreasonable.
However, it is submitted that the court of appeals failed to consider ade-
quately the critical question involved in both of the instant cases. Although
section 180-a authorizes a police officer to "retain any other thing the possession
of which may constitute a crime . . ." the statute initially authorizes only a
search for weapons. As we have seen, the sole purpose of this power is to protect
the policeman. Even after the officer had seized the articles from the defendant,
there was no probable cause for arrest in either case.38 There was no probable
cause to believe that the article removed from the defendant's person contained
contraband. Yet, in both cases the officer further examined the articles.80 This
was contrary to the police department guidelines40 which clearly provide that
the officer should not open any article that the suspect is carrying even if it may
contain a weapon. The article should be placed out of the suspect's reach so
that there is no immediate danger to the officer. 41
The "frisking" provisions of section 180-a are an attempt to balance the
safety of the police officer and the right of the suspect against a search on less
than probable cause. Obviously, the best protection for the officer would require
a thorough search of the suspect's person and any articles in his possession.
However, the latter would completely abolish the present requirement for prob-
able cause. Therefore, in the absence of probable cause, the officer's right to frisk
must be restricted even though an element of danger remains. The test suggested
by the police department-immediate danger-appears to be reasonable. Apply-
36. Another consideration might be the suspect's right to privacy. While the frisk Is an
intrusion on the privacy of the suspect, it would still appear preferable to an approach with
drawn guns because this latter method involves too great a potential of danger to both the
officer and the suspect.
37. Ronayne, supra note 13, at 237-38.
38. People v. Peters, 18 N.Y.2d at 248, 219 N.X.2d at 601, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 225 (Fuld, J.,
dissenting); People v. Sibron, 18 N.Y.2d at 608, 219 N.E.2d at 199, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 378 (Van
Voorhis, J., dissenting).
39. In Peters, the court stated that the officer was justified in examining the unsealed
envelope for a knife just as he would be warranted in examining a holster for a gun. 18
N.Y.2d at 244, 219 N.,.2d at 598, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 221-22. This is the sole argument ad-
vanced for allowing the officer to examine the envelope.
40. Instructions, op. cit. supra note 23.
41. Id. at 6.
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ing this test to the instant cases, the examination of the articles seems unreason-
able. In Sibron, particularly, it appears highly unlikely that the tin foil package
could have contained a weapon. In Peters, the envelope could possibly have con-
tained a knife. However, in neither case does it appear that there was any
immediate danger. While the article was in the officer's possession, there was no
danger. After returning the article to the suspect, a properly trained police
officer should have been able to protect himself if the suspect attempted to open
the article and remove a dangerous weapon.
The powers granted to the police under section 180-a appear to be necessary
and reasonable methods of crime prevention if properly limited. Unfortunately,
in the instant cases, the court of appeals failed to provide precise standards to
distinguish the stop and search authorized by the statute from the arrest and
search which require probable cause. In People v. Peters, the court used the
words "frisk" and "search" interchangeably and made no attempt to limit the
amount of searching authorized by the statute. In addition, the stop provisions
of the statute, as interpreted in Peters, appear to allow total and forcible restraint
of the defendant on only minimal grounds of suspicion. Since these are the only
cases decided pursuant to section 180-a, the Supreme Court, if it grants
certiorari, will be bound by this court's interpretation of the statute. 2 This being
so, there is reason to conclude that the statute, or at least the search provisions
thereof, would be held to be unconstitutional.
Jurisdiction-New York "Long-Arm" Statute-Presence Within State
Held Requisite for Commission of Tortious Act of Omission.-The defen-
dant was a Florida resident and the director of a Delaware corporation with its
principal place of business in New York. The plaintiff corporation brought an
action against the defendant for a loss resulting from his failure to attend
directors' meetings in New York. The defendant had done "nothing in connec-
tion with his duties as director other than to execute in Florida consents and
waivers of notice of special meetings and a certificate in lieu of a directors' meet-
ing." 1 He was served in Florida, and jurisdiction was claimed pursuant to
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302, the "long-arm" statute. Jurisdiction was sustained by the
special term and affirmed by the appellate division without opinion. The court
of appeals reversed. Platt Corp. v. Platt, 17 N.Y.2d 234, 217 N.E.2d 134, 270
N.Y.S.2d 408 (1966).
The question before the court was the construction of the provision of New
York's long-arm statute which permits personal service over a non-resident who
"commits a tortious act within the state." 2 The instant court, relying on
42. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962) ; Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1,
4 (1949).
1. Platt Corp. v. Platt, 17 N.Y.2d 234, 237, 217 N.E2d 134, 135, 270 N.Y.S.2d 408, 409
(1966). Such conduct is actionable under N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 720(a) (1).
2. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a), which at the time of this case read: "A court may exercise per-
sonal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary, or his executor or administrator, as to a cause
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Feathers v. McLucas,3 held that the defendant's conduct did not constitute a
"tortious act within the state." 4 In Feathers, a Kansas corporation had manu-
factured a gas tank which exploded while being trucked through New York. The
court .of appeals held that manufacturing the tank was not a "tortious act within
the state" of New York under the long-arm statute since the negligent manu-
facture had occurred in Kansas.5
The court of appeals reasoned in the instant case that "to treat an 'omission'
as an 'act' in a particular place, one must be there to do or to omit the act." 0
The court concluded that both the "plain words of the statute" and Feathers
support the finding. 7
Plaintiff made an argument similar to that maintained by the plaintiff in
Feathers, -i.e., claiming that the New York law was derived from the Illinois
of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, in the same manner as If
he were a domiciliary of the state, if, in person or through an agent, he . . .2. commits a
tortious act within the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of character aris-
ing from the act .... " Subdivision 1 of 302(2), which precedes the first paragraph above,
reads "transacts any business within the state," and was also asserted by the plaintiff, but was
dismissed rather perfunctorily by the special referee to the supreme court and by the court
of appeals. Plaintiff attempted to assert that by executing the consents, waivers and certifi-
cates, the defendant designated the other members of the board to act on his behalf as an
agent for the transaction of business within the meaning of the long-arm statute. This con-
tention was dismissed as it violated the rule that a director cannot delegate his power and
designate another to act on his behalf. Platt Corp. v. Platt, 42 Misc. 2d 640, 647, 249 N.Y.S.2d
1, 9 (Sup. Ct. 1964). The court of appeals added, in further objection to the transaction of
business argument, that the stipulated facts showed that defendant acted only In Florida
and "these acts . . . relating to the directorship, without doing anything whatever in New
York in connection with the corporation, are insufficient either as significant contacts or In-
trinsically within the statute as the transaction of 'any business within the state' to bring
defendant within the jurisdiction of New York . . . ." 17 N.Y.2d at 239, 217 NE.2d at
136, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 411.
3. In an omnibus decision, the court decided three cases including Feathers. Longines-
Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261
N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965), 34 Fordham L. Rev. 344. The cases were decided after the appellate divi-
sion affirmed the order of the supreme court in the instant case.
4. 17 N.Y.2d at 237-38, 217 N.E.2d at 135, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 410. The court did not offer
an opinion as to whether defendant's conduct constituted a "tortious act," holding that,
even if the act was tortious, it was not committed within the state. Ibid. However, the special
referee reporting to the special term was clearly of the opinion that defendant's conduct con-
stituted a "tortious act." The report disposed of defendant's contention that 302 (a) (2) was
not intended to cover acts of omission by reference to the legislative history of the "single-
act" statute. 42 Misc. 2d at 644, 249 N.Y.S.2d at 6. The court of appeals did not
deal with this question.
5. 15 N.Y.2d at 463-64, 209 N.E.2d at 79-80, 261 N.V.S.2d at 23-24.
6. 17 N.Y.2d at 237, 217 N.E.2d at 135, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 410; the court added that "the
problem is not whether the omission is right or wrong; or whether it is or is not a tort, but
whether it is a 'tortious act' committed in New York." Ibid.
7. Id. at 237-38, 217 N.E.2d at 135, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 410.
8. 15 N.Y.2d at 462-64, 209 N.E.2d at 79-80, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 22-24.
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long-arm statute.9 The phrase "commits a tortious act within the state" has
been construed by Illinois' highest court'0 to include cases of foreign acts result-
ing in local injury." However, the court of appeals stated that, if the Illinois
construction were applied to the instant case, "it would [still] not support
jurisdiction under the facts ... ." 1-
It was dearly stated by the court in Feathers that, if the tortious act charged
against the defendant was committed at all, it was committed in Kansas, the
situs of the negligent manufacture. Since an act can only be said to be tortious
when done within the context of a duty to refrain from doing that particular
act, it may be said that the court was placing the situs of the tortious act at the
situs of the duty which was breached. The instant court, however, chose to
9. 111. Ann. Stat. ch. 110, § 17(1) (Smith-Hurd 1956) reads: "Any person, whether or
not a citizen or resident of this State, who in person or through an agent does any of the
acts herinafter enumerated, thereby submits said person, and, if an individual, his personal
representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to any cause of action arising
from the doing of any of said acts . . . (b) The commission of a tortious act within this
State .... "
10. Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E2d 761
(1961).
11. 17 N.Y.2d at 238, 217 N.E.2d at 135, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 410. The facts in the Gray
case were similar to those in Feathers. Chief Judge Desmond, dissenting in Feathers, argued
that "the statutory language. . . 'commits a tortious act within the state', is taken verbatim
from Illinois law (Ill.Rev.Stat., ch.110, § 17). It has the same meaning as the phrases 'tortious
conduct' in the Connecticut and North Carolina statutes (Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev, § 33-411,
subd. [c.][19591; N. C. Gen. Stat. § 55-145, subd. (a], par. [4] [1955]) and 'part of a tort'
in the Minnesota, Texas, Vermont and West Virginia laws (Minn. Stat. Ann., § 303.13, subd.
1, par. [3] [1964 Supp.]; Tex. Civ. Stat., art. 2031b, § 4 [1959]; Vt. Stat. Ann., tit. 12, §
855; W. Va. Code Ann. [1961], § 3083)." 15 N.Y.2d at 470, 209 N.E.2d at 84, 261 N.Y.S.2d
at 29-30. The Chief Judge, assuming the synonymous construction of "tortious act" and
"part of a tort," argued that the long-arm statute did not require that every element of the
tort occur in New York. Id. at 471, 209 N.E.2d at 84, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 30. Judge Desmond
added that "when our Legislature adopted the language of the Illinois Legislature it presumably
adopted with it the construction given the statutory language by the Illinois courts in Gray."
Ibid. It is interesting to note that if one follows the rule that the locus of the tort is the place
where the last act necessary to the accrual of the cause of action occurs, then the victim might
be denied a recovery in any jurisdiction under the conflict of laws rule that "if no cause of
action is created at the place of wrong, no recovery in tort can be had in any other state."
Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 348(2) (1934). This, of course, would depend on the con-
struction of the term "created."
12. 17 N.Y.2d at 238, 217 N.E.2d at 135, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 410. The Illinois federal courts
adopted a view contrary to Gray before that case was decided by the state court. Trippe
Mfg. Co. v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 270 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1959); Henriegel v. Sears Roebuck
& Co., 157 F. Supp. 718 (N.D. Ill. 1957). Both of these cases adopted the view that "within
the state" does not include the case of foreign act resulting in local injury. However, after
the Gray case was decided the Illinois federal courts adopted the state supreme court's in-
terpretation of the long-arm statute. Anderson v. Penncraft Tool Co., 200 F. Supp. 145
(ND. IM. 1961) ; McMahon v. Boeing Airplane Co., 199 F. Supp. 908 (ND. III. 1961). Under
a simila statute. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-145 (1965), a result similar to Hellreigel was reached
in Putnam v. Triangle Publications, Inc. 245 N.C. 432, 96 S.E.2d 445 (1957).
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read Feathers as standing for the proposition that the actor's physical presence
in New York is required if he is to be deemed to have committed a tortious act
within the state.13 On the facts of the instant case, however, the duty which was
breached existed in New York, and this, it is submitted, is a sufficient basis on
which to predicate jurisdiction.14
Subsequent to the instant case, and largely because of the undesirable holding
in Feathers, the New York legislature amended N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302.11 The
Judicial Conference said that the construction of section 302 by the court of
appeals in Feathers was contrary to the intent of the legislature in adopting
that section.' 0 "To accomplish [the original] ...aim the proposed legislation
. . .would broaden New York's long-arm jurisdiction so as to include non-
residents who cause tortious injury in the state by an act or omission without the
state." 17 In the instant case, Judge Bergan noted that this amendment was an
attempt to broaden 302 in light of Feathers. Nevertheless, he was of the opinion
that its broader language would still not allow in personam jurisdiction over the
defendant in the instant case.' 8 This is because, though the plaintiff is the
victim of a tortious act without the state causing him injury within the state,
none of the required additional facts of contact were present. 19
It appears from the history of New York's long-arm statute, the recent
13. 17 N.Y.2d at 237, 217 N.E.2d at 135, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 410.
14. Constitutionally, the exercise of jurisdiction in this case seems well within the guide-
lines stated in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
15. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302 now reads in part: "(a) Acts which are the basis of jurisdiction.
As to a cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a court may
exercise personal jurisdiction over any nondomiciliary, or his executor or administrator, who
in person or through an agent . . .2. commits a tortious act within the state, except as to a
cause of action for defamation of character arising from the act; or 3. commits a tortious
act without the state causing injury to person or property within the state, except as to a
cause of action for defamation of character arising from the act, if he (i) regularly does or
solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial
revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in the state, or (ii) expects or
should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and derives substantial
revenue from interstate or international commerce .... "
New York's long-arm statute as amended is similar to the Uniform Interstate and Inter-
national Procedure Act § 1.03, reads in part. "(a) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction
over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a (cause of action] [claim for relief]
arising from the person's . . . (3) causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this state;
(4) causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omission outside this state if be regularly
does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives sub-
stantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in this state . . . ." The
sections relating to tortious acts without the state which cause injury within the state arc
virtually the same and it appears that the instant case would not fall within the uniform act.
16. Legislative Memorandum of the Judicial Conference, in N.Y. Scss. Laws a-237
(McKinney's 1966).
17. Id. at a-238.
18. 17 N.Y.2d at 238, 217 N.E.2d at 135-36, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 410-11.
19. For additional contact requirements see N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302 (a) (3).
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amendment, Feathers and the instant case, that the legislature is seeking to
broaden -New York's power to render in personam judgments over nondomicil-
iaries. At the same time, however, the court of appeals has required dear and
explicit statutory language before it broadens the scope of the statute toward
the outer limits of due process. This is a sensitive area in which it is easy to cause
hardship to a plaintiff-by making him travel to a distant state to assert a cause
of action if long-arm jurisdiction is not permitted-and similarly to a defendant
-by causing him to travel at great length to defend if such jurisdiction is per-
mitted. In essence, this should be the consideration of the courts in interpreting
phrases such as "tortious act within the state" and "transacts business within
the state." Such phrases are meant to be guidelines and are intended to evince
how far toward the limits of due process the legislature wishes to move in giving
its citizens the benefits of a long-arm statute. Perhaps the fault with the long-
arm statute is that the statements of jurisdictional power therein are in terms
of artificial rules. The result of such rules appears to be inconsistent applica-
tions of the statute supported by ambiguous arguments based primarily upon
semantics. For example,
if a New Jersey domiciliary were to lob a bazooka shell across the Hudson River at
Grant's Tomb ... Feathers would appear to bar the New York courts from asserting
personal jurisdiction over the Jersey domiciliary in an action by an injured New York
plaintiff. Yet, if the New Jersey domiciliary permitted his son to drive an automobile
into the state, New York could acquire personal jurisdiction under both McKinney's
Vehicle and Traffic Law, § 253, and indeed under CPLR 302.
Such a result has been strongly criticized,2 1 and indicates the danger in arbitrary
jurisdiction rules. Long-arm statutes should, therefore, be clear statements of
how close to constitutional limits the legislature intends to extend jurisdiction.
A legislature could perhaps accomplish this admittedly difficult task by defining
jurisdiction in terms of contacts and fairness to defendants, and thereby avoid
the difficulties faced by the instant court.
Labor Law-Union-Antitrust---Clear Proof of Predatory Intent Necessary
To Establish That a National Wage Agreement Restricting Competition
Among Marginal Operators Violates the Sherman Act.-In a suit for royalty
payments under a national wage agreement brought by the United Mine Workers
against certain small coal companies, the defendants cross-claimed for treble
damages, alleging an antitrust conspiracy. The United Mine Workers, de-
fendants contended, conspired with certain major producers to drive the
defendants out of business. As one part of a larger conspiracy, the union
allegedly agreed, in return for acceptance of their wage demands, to aid in
the mechanization of the industry and to impose a uniform wage scale throughout
20. McLaughlin, 1965 Supplementary Practice Commentary to McKinney's N.Y. C.P.L.R.
302, at 76 (Supp. 1966). (Emphasis added.)
21. See, e.g., Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction
in Illinois, 1963 U. Ill. L.F. 533, 549.
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the industry regardless of the financial ability of marginal operators to meet
such demands.' Trying several consolidated suits without a jury, the court
found no evidence of a conspiracy between union and employers to eliminate
competitors. Lewis v. Pennington, CCH Lab. L. Rep. (53 Lab. Cas.) 11371, at
17228 (E.D. Tenn. July 15, 1966).2
In attempts to balance the conflicting policies underlying labor and antitrust
legislation,3 the Supreme Court has practically immunized union activity from
attack under the Sherman Act.4 The Court, in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,
announced a doctrine proscribing under antitrust law only those labor activities
which restrain commercial competition through direct price or market control.0
Labor should be free, Apex declared, to eliminate product market competition
based on differentials in labor market standards.1 The Court, in United States
v. Hutcheson,$ held that all labor activities motivated by union self-interest
and arising from a dispute over terms and conditions of employment stand
exempt from antitrust liability as long as they involve no combination with non-
labor groups.9
The concept of an illicit union-non-labor combination, only dicta in Hutche-
son,'° received further clarification in Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, Int'l Bkd. ol
1. The other grounds of the alleged conspiracy included a combination among the union,
the Tennessee Valley Authority, and the large coal companies, including one financed by the
union, to force the smaller companies out of the TVA market through a scheme of price-
fixing and bid-rigging; and an agreement by the large companies to refuse to lease coal lands
to the smaller companies as they customarily did. Lewis v. Pennington, CCH Lab. L. Rep.
(53 Lab. Cas.) I 11371, at 17230-33 (E.D. Tenn. July 15, 1966).
2. The case was tried before a federal district court on remand from the United States
Supreme Court. In UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965), the Supreme Court reversed
a lower court finding of an antitrust violation, 325 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1963), on grounds of
an erroneous admission of evidence. 381 U.S. at 671-72. The Court held that joint efforts of
union and employers to influence a public official did not violate the Sherman Act, even
though intended to eliminate competition. Id. at 669-72.
3. For a comprehensive treatment of the inherent conflict in legislative policy on labor
unions as against policy on commercial competition, and judicial attempts to construct a
practical rationale for implementing these divergent policies, see Report of the Committee on
Antitrust & Labor Relations Law, ABA Section of Labor Relations Law, Ann. Rep. (1966);
Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws-A Preliminary Analysis, 104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 252 (1955);
Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining, and the Antitrust Laws, 32 U. Chli. L. Rev.
659 (1965); Winter, Collective Bargaining and Competition: The Application of Antitrust
Standards to Union Activities, 73 Yale L.J. 14 (1963); Comment, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 742
(1966); Comment, 34 Fordham L. Rev. 286 (1965).
4. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964).
5. 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
6. Id. at 500-03.
7. Id. at 503.
8. 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
9. Id. at 232-34.
10. UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 662 (1965).
Elec. Workers." In Allen Bradley, a union local violated the Sherman Act by
participating in a conspiracy with employers which established a complete
monopoly of trade in the New York City electrical goods market. The Court
found that the union, although acting in its own self-interest, had aided a non-
labor combination to violate the Sherman Act through an industry-wide agree-
ment aimed at both terms and conditions of employment and direct price
and market control. 2 The Allen Bradley Court, however, mischaracterized the
facts, by not disturbing the finding below that the union had instigated the con-
spiracy while treating the conspiracy as employer-instigated,' 3 and thereby cast
some doubt on the ultimate reach of its doctrine.' 4 Moreover, the Court failed to
provide a sufficiently workable definition of illicit union-non-labor combination
to apply to analogous variants of the Allen Bradley facts. 15 Allen Bradley ap-
parently predicated the illegality of the combination on the form of the union-
employer agreement rather than on the resulting actual restraints of trade. While
assuming that a union might negotiate a series of parallel restrictive agreements
11. 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
12. Id. at 810.
13. The trial court found that the union had been "the actuating party" in the con-
spiracy. 41 F. Supp. 727, 750 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (Clark, Special Master). The Supreme Court did
not disturb the lower court's findings, but mischaracterized the initiative and driving force sup-
plied by the local as coming from the business group. 325 U.S. at 807-12; see Meltzer, supra
note 3, at 675. Mr. Justice Roberts, concurring in Allen Bradley, criticized the majority opinion
as conveying "an incorrect impression of the genesis and character of the conspiracy." 325
U.S. at 813. Mr. Justice Murphy dissented on the ground that on the facts found below, no
loss of anti-trust immunity occurred. The union had not "aided" or "abetted" an employer
violation, but had been "the dynamic force" behind the combination. Id. at 820-21.
14. The cases following Allen Bradley illustrate the uncertainty arising from this ambigu-
ous characterization of the facts. See, e.g., East Texas Motor Freight Lines v. International
Bhd. of Teamsters, 163 F.2d 10 (5th Cir. 1947) (neither union nor employer enjoined from
union-instigated boycotting) ; Greenstein v. National Skirt & Sportswear Ass'n, 178 F. Supp.
681 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), appeal dismissed, 274 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1960) (collective bargaining
contract insufficient evidence of illicit combination because employers were coerced by
union); United States v. Hamilton Glass Co., 155 F. Supp. 878 (N.D. Ill. 1957) (union not
liable without independent employer conspiracy).
15. Most of the cases following Allen Bradley have involved union-non-labor combinations
aimed at direct market restraints through price-fixing, market-allocation and bid-rigging
schemes. See, eg., United Bhd. of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395 (1947) ; United
States v. Gasoline Retailers Ass'n, 285 F.2d 688 (7th Cir. 1961) ; Las Vegas Merchant Plumb-
ers Ass'n v. United States, 210 F.2d 732 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 817 (1954). Allen
Bradley, however, lends itself to a variety of interpretations, some of which are summarized
and analysed in Bernhardt, The Allen Bradley Doctrine: An Accommodation of Conflicting
Policies, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1094, 1097-1101 (1962). Since the Allen Bradley Court con-
demned the union both for aiding and abetting a non-labor combination and for agreeing to
schemes of price and market control, the following interpretation of the case seems most war-
ranted: the Sherman Act proscribes union-non-labor combinations which institute direct
price and market restraints essentially similar to those instituted by businessmen not com-
bined with labor, even though such restrictions are instigated by a union pursuant to its own
self-interest. See Meltzer, supra note 3, at 675-76.
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with competing firms without violation, the Court condemned a single agreement
with a multi-employer group as a restraint of trade, even though identical restric-
tions would result in both cases.16
In UMW v. Pennington,17 the Supreme Court rendered its initial treatment of a
"national wage agreement"' s under the Sherman Act and its first re-examination
of labor's antitrust liability in the twenty years since Allen Bradley. Pennington
augured a restriction of labor's immunity from antitrust.1 9 The Court, however,
split into three equal factions 0 and offered no clear consensus as to the re-
defined scope of labor's antitrust liability.
The opinion of the Court 2 ' proposed to submit to antitrust scrutiny any
union-employer agreement binding a union to impose a labor standard outside
the immediate bargaining unit.2 Reasoning that such agreements restrict the
freedom of economic units to act, this opinion considered such "extra-unit"
agreements inherently inimical to antitrust policy, without regard to anti-
competitive intention or effect, and thereby a per se violation of the Sherman
16. 325 U.S. at 808-10. Mr. Justice Roberts criticised this distinction as "unrealistic and
unworkable." Id. at 819 (concurring opinion). Cox, supra note 3, at 271, also criticised this
predication of antitrust violation on the form of agreement. "An association of employers
which bargains as a unit ought to have the same privilege of surrendering to union demands
as a series of individual firms, yet such an arrangement . . . is vulnerable under the Allen-
Bradley ruling" even though not involving a combination of business firms. Ibid. (Italics
omitted.)
17. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
18. Certain large industries, such as the coal, steel, rubber and automobile industries,
engage in "national" or "pattern" bargaining, where a single union, which dominates the
industry, seeks to obtain stabilization of labor standards by bargaining first with certain
market leaders to set a pattern for later negotiations with smaller operators.
19. For comments on the potential impact of the Pennington decision, see Report of thc
Committee on Antitrust and Labor Relations Law, ABA Section of Labor Relations Law, Ann.
Rep. 4 (1966) ; Hoerner, The Supreme Court and the Labor Exemption, 29 ABA Section of
Antitrust Law 133 (1965); Meltzer, supra note 3; Comment, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 742 (1966);
Comment, 34 Fordham L. Rev. 286 (1965).
20. Mr. Justice White, with Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Brennan joining,
delivered the Court's opinion. 381 U.S. 657, 659. Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by Mr. Justices
Black and Clark, wrote a concurring opinion. Id at 672. Mr. Justice Goldberg, with Mr.
Justices Harlan and Stewart, dissented. Id. at 697.
21. Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Brennan joined in this opinion by Mr. Jus-
tice White.
22. 381 U.S. at 668-69. The White group, however, would allow a union to impose a uni-
form wage scale on an industry-wide, multi-employer bargaining unit, even though it
suspected that marginal operators would be unable to compete. Likewise, a union, acting
unilaterally without agreement with any employer group, might legally negotiate parallel
restrictive agreements. Id. at 665 n.2. Therefore, where Allen Bradley seems to condemn an
anticompetitive agreement with a multi-employer unit, 325 U.S. 808-10, Pennington would not.
23. The term "extra-unit" refers to an agreement between union and employer wherein
the union binds itself to impose a particular labor standard outside the immediate bargaining
unit.
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Act 24 Apparently, Allen Bradley was interpreted as holding that a violation of
antitrust law arises from the means utilized rather than the end intended or
achieved.2 5 Moreover, it was stated that evidence of parallel restrictive agree-
ments, unilaterally negotiated by the union, would support an inference of such
an illicit extra-unit agreement but would not in itself establish a violation.2 0
The instant court considered assertions by the plaintiff that direct evidence
of such an extra-unit agreement as to labor standards to prevail in other bar-
gaining units appeared in the formal contract signed by the union and the
large coal companies and that the agreement constituted a per se violation of
the Sherman Act. The court noted ambiguity in the contract, but found that it
obligated the union to enforce full compliance to its terms only among "'parties
signatory thereto.' "27 By limiting itself to consideration of direct proof, the
court impliedly rejected indirect evidence as probative of the asserted extra-
unit agreement. The court, however, would have achieved a more desirable re-
sult by explicitly repudiating the per se approach apparently proposed in the
Pennington case.
The per se doctrine received no support from the other two factions in
Pennington. The dissent rightly questioned the validity of basing union antitrust
liability "on the form of unit determination rather than the substance of the
collective bargaining impact on the industry."28 This opinion also criticized the
per se approach as oblivious to the practical realities facing union and manage-
ment in industries engaged in pattern bargaining situations.20 The per se rule
24. 381 U.S. at 668-69. See Report of the Committee on Antitrust and Labor Relations
Law, ABA Section of Labor Relations Law, Ann. Rep. 4, 49 (1966). The White opinion stated
that extra-unit agreements as to labor standards, by surrendering a union's "freedom of action
with respect to its bargaining policy," suffer from a more basic defect, from the viewpoint
of antitrust policy, than anticompetitive intention or effect. 381 U.S. at 668. The logical nexus
between such voluntary restriction of its freedom of action in future bargaining and per se
violation of the Sherman Act seems tenuous at best. The White opinion, in concluding,
explicitly stated that such agreements are "not exempt from the antitrust laws." Id. at 669.
Forfeiture of exemption, however, does not in itself determine liability. See Handler, Analysis
of Pennington, Jewel Tea Antitrust Opinions, 60 L.R.R.M. 56, 57 (1966), where it is stated
that "to determine whether a union has infringed the antitrust laws, there must be a two-
pronged inquiry. First we must ascertain whether the challenged acts of agreement fall within
the exemption. If they do, that, of course, is the end of the matter. If they do not, we must
still face the question whether they constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade." The White
opinion might, therefore, lend itself to the interpretation that extra-unit agreements concern-
ing labor standards merely forfeit labor's exemption from antitrust scrutiny without per
se determining liability. See Meltzer, supra note 3, at 720-21, for a suggestion that the per se
approach of the White group may be dismissed as dicta.
25. UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 720-21 (1965) (dissenting opinion).
26. Id. at 665 n.2. Mr. justice Goldberg interpreted the White opinion as allowing an
inference of illicit extra-unit agreement from the indirect evidence of a course of conduct.
Id. at 714-15 (dissenting opinion).
27. CCH Lab. L. Rep. (53 Lab. Cas.) ff 11371, at 17266.
28. 381 U.S. at 722 (dissenting opinion).
29. Id. at 720 (dissenting opinion).
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of the opinion of the Court in Pennington would handcuff negotiators in such
situations, since employers will almost always seek to secure assurances from
the union that the competition will suffer the same economic disadvantages with
regard to labor standards. Although direct evidence of a formal agreement by
a union to impose labor standards beyond a bargaining unit will rarely appear,
tacit assurances of a union's intent to impose uniform standards throughout an
industry will seldom be absent 30 Under the per se approach, such a tacit
understanding between union and employer "may start both . . . on the road
to antitrust sanctions, criminal and civil."'3 Finally, the per se approach would
bar a basic element of bargaining from the conference room and "severely
restrict free collective bargaining."32
The guidelines laid down by the concurring opinion in Pennington would pro-
scribe under the Sherman Act any industry-wide agreement whose high wage
scale intentionally forced marginal competitors out of business.83 This view
would hold, moreover, that a prima facie case could be established against a
union by showing an industry-wide agreement containing a high wage scale
which would necessarily result in forcing marginal competitors out of business.8 4
Although clearly including intent as an element of liability, the concurring
opinion would consider an effectively anticompetitive wage agreement to be
prima facie evidence of predatory intent.
Although the instant court found no antitrust violation in the formal contract
between the union and the large coal companies, it also considered the effects
of the contract under the guidelines of the concurring opinion. The court con-
cluded that although the agreed wage scale exceeded the financial ability of
the smaller companies, clear proof of predatory intent on the part of the union
would have to be established before holding that the union had violated the
antitrust laws.35 Thus, the instant case rejected the prima facie approach. The
present court failed to articulate the precise reasoning behind its holding, but the
decision stems from solid ground. The wage agreement reached by the United
Mine Workers and the large coal companies arose from a legitimate labor dispute
30. See Iserman, The Labor Monopoly Problem: Gwinn-Fisher Bill Would Effect Reforms,
38 A.B.A.J. 743, 744 (1952); UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 715-16 (1965) (dissenting
opinion).
31. Id. at 716 (dissenting opinion).
32. Id. at 714 (dissenting opinion).
33. Id. at 672-73 (concurring opinion).
34. Ibid.
35. CCH Lab. L. Rep. (53 Lab. Cas.) f1 11371, at 17239. Intent or motive as a criterion of
legality for labor activities, however, has been criticized in the past. The Hutcheson case held
that the legitimacy of union activities should not be determined by judicial "judgment regard-
ing the wisdom or unwisdom, the rightness or wrongness, the selfishness or unselfishness of
the end of which the particular union activities are the means." 312 U.S. at 232. "Motivation
is a slippery guide, for a man can always be found to, and in a sense does, intend any con-
sequence which foreseeably follows from his conduct." Cox, supra note 3, at 263-64. "[Ilt Is
also arguable that the NLRA protection of . . . wage bargaining . . . should not be con-
tingent on matters as elusive as the intent imputed to the parties." Meltzer, supra note 3,
at 691.
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over terms and conditions of employment, and should, therefore, enjoy exemp-
tion from antitrust scrutiny under the holding in the Hutchzeson decision.3 0
To retain the Hutcheson exemption, the wage agreement need only avoid
combination with non-labor and stem from a motive of union self-interest.
Under Allen Bradley, a collective bargaining agreement alone would fail to
constitute an illicit combination without additional evidence of union con-
spiracy to restrain trade for the direct benefit of a business group.37 The in-
stant case adhered to the doctrine of Allen Bradley by requiring clear proof
that the collective bargaining agreement was intended by the union to drive
marginal operators out of competition for the benefit of the large coal com-
panies.&38 The predatory intent test also serves to determine the union's per-
formance of the Hutcheson condition that a union act in its own self-interest
to retain antitrust immunity. The United Mine Workers, in negotiating the wage
scale under controversy, acted pursuant to a policy of self-interest articulated
by it for the past thirty years.39 Realizing that the existence of marginal
operators unable to afford uniformly high labor standards militates against the
best interests of the workers, the union has consistently sought such uniformly
high standards, agreeing, in return, to aid in the mechanization of the industry.40
In the instant bargaining situation, therefore, the motives of union and employer
coincide, the union seeking elimination of product market competition based
on differentials in labor standards, a legitimate goal under Apex,4 ' and the
employers seeking protection from competitors paying low wages. This coin-
cidence of motive leaves the union vulnerable to charges of predatory intent,
even though the union's intent is not specifically to restrain trade but to
ameliorate labor standards.43
The instant court, however, protected the union from too facile an inference
of predatory intent by demanding proof of such anticompetitive intent by an
evidentiary standard somewhere in the middle ground between a "preponder-
ance of the evidence," usual in civil cases, and the criminal standard of proof
"beyond a reasonable doubt. 4 The court adopted this standard of "clear
proof" as enunciated by the Supreme Court in UMW v. Gibbs.4 5 Gibbs applied
section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act4" to a state tort claim arising from a
36. See notes 8-9 supra and accompanying text.
37. 325 U.S. at 809.
38. CCH Lab. L. Rep. (53 Lab. Cas.) f 11371, at 17239.
39. See UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 698 (1965) (dissenting opinion).
40. See ibid.
41. See notes 5-7 supra and accompanying text.
42. See UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 720 (1965) (dissenting opinion).
43. See ibid.
44. CCH Lab. L.Rep. (53 Lab. Cas.) U 11371, at 17239.
45. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
46. "No officer or member of any association or organization, and no association or organi-
zation participating or interested in a labor dispute, shall be held responsible or liable in any
court of the United States for the unlawful acts of individual officers, members, or agents,
except upon clear proof of actual participation in .. .or of ratification of such acts after
actual knowledge thereof." 47 Stat. 71 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 106 (1964).
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labor dispute and held the union not liable for tortious acts of members, absent
"clear proof" that the union participated in, authorized or ratified such acts.47
Gibbs, however, contained no antitrust issue, and therefore provides somewhat
dubious authority for applying the evidentiary standard of section 6 of Norris-
LaGuardia to a determination of a union's intent to restrain trade.48
Practically assessed, the instant holding49 would appear to insulate a union
engaged in national or pattern bargaining from interference through antitrust
action. The requirement of clear proof of specifically predatory intent to
eliminate competition, even where competitive restraints are the necessary re-
sults of a particular agreement, should prove an almost insurmountable ob-
stacle to establishing a union antitrust violation in analogous situations.50
47. 383 U.S. at 736-37.
48. Gibbs, however, relied on an earlier decision, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. United
States, 330 U.S. 395 (1947), which provides a somewhat more analogous authority. This case
held § 6 of Norris-LaGuardia applicable to a determination of the liability of a national
brotherhood for antitrust conspiracies engaged in by member locals. Id. at 403.
49. The instant court also held that the alleged conspiracy to force the smaller companies
out of the TVA market comprised nothing more than accepted business practices, without
evidence of predatory intent or illegal bidding, and that the provision in the contract prohib-
iting the leasing of coal lands to the small companies was merely a protective clause insuring
the union that the large companies would not utilize such practices to evade the payment of
the agreed wage scale. CCH Lab. L. Rep. (53 Lab. Cas.) ff 11371, at 17259, 17266, 17267.
50. Where conduct or an agreement actually restrains trade, or where such unreasonable
restraint would be the necessary consequence of particular conduct or agreements, a finding
of specific predatory intent is normally deemed superfluous. E.g., Times-Picayune Publishing
Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 626 (1953); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,
334 U.S. 131, 173 (1948) ; United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105 (1948) ; United States
v. Reading Co., 226 US. 324, 370 (1912), modified on other grounds, 228 U.S. 158 (1913).
For, as the courts have indicated, "no monopolist monopolizes unconscious of what he is
doing." United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 432 (2d Cir. 1945). To
require a showing of predatory intent, in addition to necessary restraints of trade, the
Supreme Court has stated, "would cripple the [Sherman] Act." United States v. Griffith,
supra at 105. Only where restraints of trade are a mere probability does intent become an
important element of legality. United States v. Reading, supra at 370. Though the cases cited
above involved business groups alone, the tenor of their holdings indicates the difficult burden
imposed on a plaintiff attempting to prove predatory intent by a union in a situation similar
to that in the instant case.
Moreover, the instant case's standard of proof does nothing to mollify such a plaintiff's
task. In a sharp dissent in the Carpenters case, Mr. Justice Frankfurter maintained that "the
conditions formulated by the Court, which must now be met before a union may be held to
liability, are practically unrealizable . . . . It will be difficult to charge a union with culpa-
bility unless a convention of its membership . . . should knowingly authorize or approve a
violation of the Sherman Law, or give carte blanche to the officers of the union by approving
in advance whatever they may do, no matter what the legal significance." 330 U.S. at 415-16.
If, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter feared, clear proof of union participation in, or authorization of,
conduct or agreements violating antitrust, is so difficult, then clear proof of so elusive a factor
as intent or motive would be practically impossible.
Torts-Negligence--Unsafe Condition of Supermarket Floor Creates
Inference of Storekeeper's Negligence.-Plaintiff, a customer in the defen-
dant's self-service supermarket, slipped and fell when she stepped on a string
bean in the vegetable section of the market. The plaintiff did not prove how the
string bean came to be on the floor, nor how long it had been there prior to the
accident. The trial court dismissed the action at the end of the plaintiff's case,'
and an intermediate court affirmed.2 On appeal, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey reversed, holding that the supermarket owner would have to overcome
an inference that the fault in the accident was his. Wollerman v. Grand Union
Stores, Inc., 47 N.J. 426, 221 A.2d 513 (1966).
That the supermarket is not an insurer of its business invitees is well es-
tablished in the law.3 Supermarket liability in "slip and fall" accidents has
depended upon proving the defendant's negligence by a preponderance of the
evidence. The defendant's negligence, shown by either direct or circumstantial
evidence, can consist in either initially creating the risk4 or in failing to eliminate
it within a reasonable time after discovery.3 The courts have also relied upon
a theory of constructive notice to hold the store liable where actual knowledge
of the hazard could not be shown."
In typical situations, the defendant's negligence was shown where he had
overloaded the vegetable bins,7 used ice to preserve the vegetables,8 or had set
up a scale at such a distance from the vegetable counter so as to necessitate
excess handling by the customers. 9 The defendant has been held to have con-
1. The trial court found that "the evidence was insufficient because there was no proof
that defendant knew the bean was on the floor, or that the bean was there long enough to
permit an inference that defendant knew of it." Wollerman v. Grand Union Stores, Inc., 47
N.J. 426, 428, 221 A.2d 513, 514 (1966).
2. Ibid.
3. Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 6, 14 (1958).
4. E.g., Long v. National Food Stores, Inc., 262 N.C. 57, 136 S.E.2d 275 (1964). On facts
similar to those in the instant case, the court in the National Food case reversed a non-suit
for the plaintiff, noting that the grapes on which the plaintiff fell were covered with lint and
dust, thus creating the likelihood that an employee had negligently swept the grapes aside
instead of removing them. In Plaga v. Foltis, 88 N.J. Super. 209, 211 A.2d 391 (App. Div.
1965), the court found in favor of the plaintiff who had slipped in defendant's restaurant
since it was shown that the debris upon which plaintiff fell could have only been dropped
by defendant's employee.
5. E.g., Winsby v. Kertell, 10 Cal. App. 2d 61, 50 P.2d 1075 (1935). In the Winsby case,
the court affirmed a judgment for plaintiff who slipped in defendant's store. The evidence
established that the defendant was given notice of the debris and had instructed an employee
to clean it up, but the employee failed to do so.
6. See notes 10-11 infra and accompanying text.
7. Pabst v. Hfllman's, 293 II. App. 547, 13 N.E.2d 77 (1938).
8. Torda v. Grand Union Co., 59 N.J. Super. 41, 157 A.2d 133 (App. Div. 1959). In the
Torda case, the plaintiff was injured when she slipped in a puddle of water presumably caused
by ice melting in the vegetable bins. The court, in holding defendant-supermarket liable,
reasoned that other steps could have been taken to refrigerate the vegetables and thus obviate
this danger.
9. Moone v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 148 S.W.2d 628 (Mo. Ct. App. 1941). De-
1966] CASE NOTES
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35
structive notice when it was shown that the floors in general were left dirty10 or
when the condition of the debris itself indicated that it had been on the floor
for a long time.1 Absent such a showing of the storekeeper's negligence by an
injured customer, the defendant has generally prevailed.' 2
The decision in the instant case marks a break with the established prece-
dents of other New Jersey cases. Prior to the instant holding, the 1952 case of
Simpson v. Duffy13 had been the leading authority on "slip and fall" in New
Jersey. Although factually similar to the problem case, the instant court made
no attempt to reconcile or distinguish it. In Simpson, the evidence established
that the plaintiff-customer slipped on a vegetable leaf near two of the super-
market's employees who were trimming vegetables and loading them into bins.' 4
The court, in granting the defendant's motion to dismiss at the end of the
customer's case, stated that "the possibility of one customer dropping a
vegetable particle while serving himself must be recognized as well as the possi-
bility of a fall thereon by the customer who immediately succeeds him."' 0 To
hold the supermarket liable "would in effect impose an obligation more drastic
than the law considers is required by the exigencies of the business."' 0
It is on this point that the instant court differs from Simpson. The instant
court felt that "substantial risk of injury"' 7 was "implicit in the manner
fendant-supermarket, in the Moone case, placed a scale for the customer's use on the side
of the aisle opposite the vegetables. When the plaintiff fell on a string bean, the court held
that by so positioning the scale the defendant was liable for creating a situation where the
probability of vegetables falling was increased.
10. Morgan v. Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co., 266 N.C. 221, 145 S.E.2d 877 (1966).
11. E.g., Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Bennett, 267 Ala. 538, 103 So. 2d 177 (1958).
In Bennett, the plaintiff had slipped on a vegetable leaf in the defendant's supermarket. The
court held for the plaintiff, as the dirty condition of the vegetable leaf created the inference
that it had been on the floor a sufficient period of time to give the defendant notice of Its
presence.
The concept of holding the supermarket liable on this theory of constructive notice has
met with opposition recently. In Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Giles, 354 S.W.2d 410 (Tex.
Ct. Civ. App. 1962), the court refused to charge the storekeeper with constructive knowl-
edge that a grape causing plaintiff's fall had been on his floor. The court in Great Ad. &
Pac. Tea Co. v. Berry, 203 Va. 913, 128 S.E.2d 311 (1962), expressly rejected the theory
of constructive notice. Id. at 917, 128 S.E.2d at 314.
12. In Todd v. Hill's, Inc., 383 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1964), the plaintiff was
injured when she fell on a lettuce leaf in the defendant's market. In affirming a directed
verdict for defendant at the close of plaintiff's case, the court said that the "mere proof
of the occurrence of the fall, coupled with proof that a piece of lettuce was upon the floor, is
insufficient to show negligence on the part of the appellee." Id. at 251. On these same facts,
the appellate court of Illinois reached the same conclusion in Wroblewski v. Hillman's, Inc.,
43 D"I. App. 2d 246, 193 N.E.2d 470 (1963).
13. 19 N.J. Super. 339, 88 A.2d 520 (App. Div.), certification denied, 10 N.J. 315, 91 A.2d
230 (1952).
14. Id. at 342, 88 A.2d at 522.
15. Id. at 350, 88 A.2d at 526.
16. Ibid.
17. 47 N.J. at 430, 221 A.2d at 515.
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in which"' 8 supermarkets do business today, and, accordingly, imposed a greater
obligation upon the storeowner in forcing him to defeat an inference of his
negligence. In so doing, the court has in effect applied the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur' 9 to a supermarket "slip and fall" accident. With the exception of
Barca v. Daitch Crystal Dairies, Inc.,0 a New York lower court case, this doc-
trine has universally been held inapplicable to an accident of this type.21
Prior to the Barca case, res ipsa had been applied to supermarket accidents
which involved either exploding bottles -2 or falling objects.? However, both
these applications had existed prior to their extension into the supermarket -4
18. Ibid.
19. Traditionally, the requisites for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor
have been:
"(1) the event must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of some-
one's negligence;
(2) it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the
defendant;
(3) it must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the
plaintiff." Prosser, Torts § 39, at 218 (3d ed. 1964).
20. 45 Misc. 2d 30, 256 N.YS.2d 14 (App. T. 1965). In this case, a shopper had slipped
on some sugar which had run into the aisle from a broken sack. The evidence also estab-
lished that there were marks through the sugar from the wheels of shopping carts, thus
indicating that the store had constructive notice of the condition. This, however, was con-
sidered by the court to be of relevance only in that it represented a second theory upon
which liability could have been predicated if the court had so desired. In the instant case,
constructive notice was not in issue as the evidence failed to establish how long the vege-
table had been on the floor. 47 N.J. at 428, 221 A.2d at 514.
21. Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 6, 59 (1958). The annotation remarks that "the patent inappli-
cability of the doctrine is indicated by the relatively small number of the cases ... in which
the courts have felt required even to mention such inapplicability." Id. at 59 n.6; accord, Owen
v. Beauchamp, 66 Cal. App. 2d 750, 152 P.2d 756 (1944), wherein the plaintiff was injured
when she slipped on some dental wax in the reception room of the dentist's office. The
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was held inapplicable as the court felt the instrumentality caus-
ing the injury was not within the sole control of the party charged with responsibility. In
Coyne v. Mutual Grocery Co., 116 N.J.L. 36, 181 AUt. 314 (1935), a customer was injured
from a fall on vegetable debris in defendant's store. The court, in holding for the defendant,
said that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was inapplicable. "It may be invoked only when
the thing shown bespeaks defendant's negligence, not merely the happening of the accidenL"
Id. at 38-39, 181 AUt. at 315. (Footnote omitted.) The court continued by saying "the mere
presence of such vegetable matter upon the floor obviously does not bespeak the defendant's
negligence." Id. at 39, 181 Atl. at 316.
22. E.g., Day v. Grand Union Co., 304 N.Y. 821, 109 N.E.2d 609 (1952) (memorandum
decision); Hyams v. King Kullen Grocery Co., 20 App. Div. 2d 657, 246 N.Y.S. 2d 575 (2d
Dep't 1964) (memorandum decision).
23. Perito v. Sunrise Supermarket Corp., 33 Misc. 2d 627, 229 N.YS.2d 667 (App. T.
1961) (per curiam); Robinson v. AUt. & Pac. Tea Co., 184 Misc. 571, 54 N.Y.S.2d 42 (App.
T.), aff'd mem., 269 App. Div. 977, 59 N.Y.S.2d 290, motion for leave to appeal denied, 269
App. Div. 1024, 59 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1st Dep't 1945).
24. As to falling objects see Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H. & C. 722, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (1863),
in which a flour barrel fell from an upper floor of the defendant's shop and struck a pedes-
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and the only controversy surrounding their extension involved the lack of
complete control by the defendant storekeeper. Exclusive control had always
been a requisite for the application of res ipsa,25 but the courts, reasoning that
today's self-service market posed a greater danger for the customer,20 circum-
vented this problem by holding that the storekeeper had the right to control the
instrumentality; 27 a right which he could not lose by permitting his customers
to wait on themselves.2 8 This somewhat dubious reasoning was seized upon by
the Barca court, which interpreted the policy to be that the storekeeper has the
burden of explaining all unsafe conditions,29 and extended the doctrine to a type
of accident heretofore not even within the realm of res ipsa. It appears that the
Barca court failed to take cognizance of the fact that in the exploding bottle and
falling can cases the crucial factor was the nature of the accident, and not its
occurence in a supermarket.
It is submitted that the courts in both Barca and the instant case should have
avoided reliance upon res ipsa loquitur, if for no other reason than to prevent
the furtherance of a doctrine which tends to place a premium on ignorance. 0
By forcing the defendant to defeat an inference that he was negligent, the courts
would be making him liable without fault in the many situations where be is
unable to give a satisfactory explanation of the circumstances surrounding the
accident. 31 The instant court, however, felt that it was just for the party with
trian. Chief Baron Pollock, speaking for the court, said that "there are certain cases of
which it may be said res ipsa loquitur, and this seems one of them." Id. at 725, 159 Eng.
Rep. at 300. As to exploding bottles see, e.g., Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 39 Cal. 2d 436,
247 P.2d 344 (1952) ; Bonstein v. Metropolitan Bottling Co., 26 N.J. 263, 139 A.2d 404 (1958);
Grant v. Graham Chero-Cola Bottling Co., 176 N.C. 256, 97 S.E. 27 (1918).
25. See note 19 supra.
26. Robinson v. Great At]. & Pac. Tea Co., 184 Misc. 571, 54 N.Y.S.2d 42 (App. T.),
aff'd mem., 269 App. Div. 977, 59 N.Y.S.2d 290, motion for leave to appeal denied, 269 App.
Div. 1024, 59 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1st Dep't 1945).
27. See, e.g., Cole v. Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co., 44 Misc. 2d 694, 254 N.Y.S.2d 929 (Sup.
Ct. 1964), aff'd mem., 25 App. Div. 2d 497, 267 N.Y.S.2d 328 (4th Dep't 1966).
28. Robinson v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 184 Misc. 571, 54 N.Y.S.2d 42 (App. T.),
aff'd mem., 269 App. Div. 977, 59 N.Y.S.2d 290, motion for leave to appeal denied, 269 App.
Div. 1024, 59 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1st Dep't 1945).
29. See 45 Misc. 2d at 32, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 16.
30. See Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur: A Reply to Professor Carpenter, 10 So. Cal. L. Rev.
459 (1937). Professor Prosser stated: "Is it proper policy to require the defendant to out-
weigh the plaintiff's case, because the defendant is in a better position to produce evidence?
Certainly it is not the general rule that a plaintiff may place the burden of proof of an issue
upon his adversary merely by showing that he himself is ignorant of the facts, and the
defendant knows, or should know, all about them. If it were, sheer ignorance might be the
most powerful weapon in the law." Id. at 464. (Footnote omitted.)
31. Prosser, Torts § 40, at 234 (3d ed. 1964). See Greenidge v. Great At. & Pac. Tea
Co., 164 N.Y.S.2d 831 (N.Y.C. City Ct. 1957), where the plaintiff slipped on a lettuce leaf
in defendant's supermarket. In reviewing the plaintiff's motion to set aside a verdict against
him, the court said, "boiled down to essentials, the plaintiff's contention is that if a defend-
ant has knowledge of the fact that from time to time customers carelessly or thoughtlessly
create a condition of danger, she may go to the jury merely by proving the existence of
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superior knowledge to bear the onus of producing evidence.3 This contention
seems untenable in light of today's extensive opportunities for pre-trial examina-
tion.33 It should be understood that any liability created by relying on res ipsa"
would ultimately be borne by the consumer in the form of higher prices due to
increased insurance costs.35
The solution to the problem in the instant case would seem to lie in the
intelligent application of the standards of reasonable care.36 Admittedly, the
situation in a supermarket today is different from that in prior years, and, ac-
cordingly, the course of conduct that would constitute reasonable care in the
self-service market 37 would entail more precaution 3s than a course of conduct
considered reasonable years ago. It should not follow, however, that the store-
keeper be held to a degree of care in excess of reasonable care. Nor can justifica-
tion be found for the instant court's assumption that the "overall... probability
is that defendant did less than its duty demanded, in one respect or another."' 3
the condition on the occasion of her fall, without any proof of prior notice of the actual
existence of that particular condition at the particular time and place of the fall.
"To accept that contention would make supermarkets virtually insurers of the safety of
their customers.. . .To adopt plaintiff's contention would require a holding that merely
because the defendant knows that debris is from time to time dropped on the floor of a
self-service store by customers, affirmative proof of notice of the existence of debris at the
time of the accident is not required. We do not believe that to be the law." Id. at 835-36.
(Italics omitted.)
32. 47 NJ. at 429, 221 A.2d at 515.
33. Cf. Lo Piccolo v. Knight of Rest Prods. Corp., 7 App. Div. 2d 369, 373, 183 N.Y.S.2d
301, 306 (1st Dep't 1959), aff'd mem., 9 N.Y.2d 662, 173 N.E.2d 51, 212 N.YS.2d 75 (1961).
34. See Tiberi v. Fisher Bros. Co., 96 Ohio App. 302, 121 N.E.2d 694 (1953), where the
court stated that res ipsa is a rule of evidence and should not be used to create liability,
which it thought would be the result if it were applied in a "slip and fall" accident.
35. Cf. Lo Piccolo v. Knight of Rest Prods. Corp., 7 App. Div. 2d 369, 373-74, 183
N.Y.S.2d 301, 306 (1st Dep't 1959), aff'd mem., 9 N.Y.2d 662, 173 N.E.2d 51, 212 N.Y.S.2d
75 (1961). The court expressed a feeling that the awareness of the "practical consequences"
of liability insurance is a factor which in part accounts for their hesitance to apply res ipsa.
Ibid.; see Prosser, Torts § 84, at 573 (3d ed. 1964).
36. See Comment, 16 Ala. L. Rev. 437, 444-45 (1964).
37. In Millheiser v. Smilen Bros., 183 N.Y.S.2d 183 (N.Y.C. City Ct. 1959), the court felt
that "in this new era of advanced marketing, where the consumer is invited to patronize a
self-service store or market for the purpose of making purchases, and makes selections of
commodities without the assistance or help of a clerk or employee, the owner of such busi-
ness should exercise reasonable care to maintain and keep the premises free from hazards in
the form of debris, misplaced or dislodged stock or merchandise." Id. at 185.
38. Reasonable steps to keep the floors clean would include periodic inspection and
sweeping, but to require the supermarket to package all vegetables in cellophane, Napier v.
Safeway Stores, Inc., 215 A.2d 479, 481 (D.C. Ct. App. 1965), or to station an employee to
watch after each customer, would "inevitably make the store keeper an insurer and which
burden the law declines to thrust upon him." Bosler v. Steiden Stores, Inc., 297 Ky. 17, 22,
178 S.W.2d 839, 841 (1944).
39. 47 N.J. at 429, 221 A.2d at 514-15.
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In an attempt to ease the burden of proof placed upon the plaintiff,40 the court
has created a definite inequity by placing the defendant in a position where he
may be liable without fault.
Torts-Placing Plaintiff in a Situation Where Injury to His Reputation
Is Foreseeable Held Actionable.-The plaintiff had been an innocent participant
in a rigged quiz show. He alleged that he had been induced to appear by de-
fendant's representations that the show was honest. Plaintiff further alleged that,
as a result of a scandal that revealed the true nature of the show, his reputation
was injured. The lower court found that plaintiff's complaint stated a cause of
action in defamation,' but that it was barred by the statute of limitations. 2 On
cross-appeals, the first department of the appellate division rejected theories of
defamation3 and prima facie tort, but nevertheless held the complaint sufficient
and not time-barred. Morrison v. National Broadcasting Co., 24 App. Div. 2d
284, 266 N.Y.S.2d 406 (lst Dep't 1965).
In 1889, Lord Bowen uttered his now famous dictum: "Now, intentionally to
do that which is calculated in the ordinary course of events to damage, and
which does, in fact, damage another in that other person's property or trade, is
actionable if done without just cause or excuse." 4 This concept, which became
known as the prima facie tort doctrine, received great impetus in the United
States from Mr. Justice Holmes,6 and seems to have been first recognized in
New York in 1923.6 The New York court of appeals first used it to sustain a
40. The plaintiff's burden consists in proving the defendant's negligence, as opposed to
the defendant's proving his lack of it. See 9 Wigmiore, Evidence § 2485 (3d ed. 1940). As
to the particular burden in supermarket slip and fall cases see Note, Supermarket Liability:
Problems in Proving the Slip-and-Fall Case in Florida, 18 U. Fla. L. Rev. 440 (1965).
1. Morrison v. National Broadcasting Co., 40 Misc. 2d 876, 243 N.Y.S.2d 927 (Sup. Ct.
1963).
2. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 215(3) sets a one year limitation on actions in libel or slander.
3. In addition to the lower court here, two other supreme court cases based on similar
facts arising out of dishonest quiz shows held the complaints sufficient to state causes of
action in libel, but dismissed them on other grounds. Davidson v. National Broadcasting
Co., 26 Misc. 2d 936, 204 N.Y.S.2d 532 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Goldberg v. Columbia Broadcasting
Sys., 25 Misc. 2d 129, 205 N.Y.S.2d 611 (Sup Ct. 1960).
The instant court rejected a theory of defamation because the defendants did not publish
any information concerning plaintiff. 24 App. Div. 2d at 287, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 410. The Instant
court would appear to have been correct since the general rule in New York is that there
is no liability for a third party's publication in the absence of authorization or ratification.
E.g., Schoepflin v. Coffey, 162 N.Y. 12, 56 N.E. 502 (1900); Valentine v. Gonzalez, 190
App. Div. 490, 179 N.Y. Supp. 711 (1st Dep't 1920).
4. Mogul S.S. Co. v. McGregor, Gow, & Co., 23 Q.B.D. 598, 613 (CA.) (1889), aff'd,
[1892] A.C. 25. The court here found sufficient justification in the right to compete freely.
Id. at 614.
5. See, e.g., his opinion in Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194 (1904).
6. Beardsley v. Kilner, 236 N.Y. 80, 140 N.E. 203 (1923) (dictum).
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complaint in 1941,7 and it has since become a well-established doctrine in New
York jurisprudence 8
The tort has four basic elements: the act complained of must be otherwise
lawful,9 it must be malicious,'0 the plaintiff must be injured,' and the de-
fendant's conduct must be unjustified.'- Each of these elements warrants some
discussion.
The requirement that the defendant's act must be otherwise lawful is trouble-
some. Clearly, if the plaintiff has been libelled, he may not avoid a short statute
of limitations by calling his cause of action prima fade tort.13 Similarly, "where
specific acts, recognized as tortious in the law, are asserted, the remedies lie only
in the classic categories of tort."' 4 This requirement is important mainly in
providing ease for the pleading of defenses.' 3 However, by giving "otherwise law-
ful" a narrow definition, it would be possible to rob the prima fade tort doctrine
of much of its application. For example, suppose that a defendant maliciously
lies to a plaintiff, causing him to take action to his detriment. The instant case
and an earlier appellate division decision both indicate that since lying is morally
wrong, prima facie tort would be inapplicable.' 6
There are two views on the extent of malice required. The first is that the
defendant must be motivated by a "disinterested malevolence" " toward the
plaintiff.'" Under this view, a defendant could ruthlessly destroy his competitor's
7. Opera on Tour, Inc. v. Weber, 285 N.Y. 348, 34 N.E.2d 349, cert. denied, 314 U.S.
615 (1941).
8. E.g., Advance Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 296 N.Y. 79, 70 NE.2d 401
(1946); American Guild of Musical Artists, Inc. v. Petrillo, 286 N.Y. 226, 36 N.E.2d 123
(1941). The growth of the doctrine is partially attributable to a judicial willingness to
accept novel causes of action. See, e.g., Kujek v. Goldman, 150 N.Y. 176, 178, 44 N.E. 773,
774 (1896).
9. E.g., Brandt v. Winchell, 3 N.Y.2d 628, 634, 148 N.E.2d 160, 163, 170 N.Y.S.2d 828,
833 (1958).
10. E.g., Reinforce, Inc. v. Birney, 308 N.Y. 164, 124 N.E.2d 104 (1954).
11. E.g., Rager v. McCloskey, 305 N.Y. 75, 81, 111 N.E.2d 214, 218 (1953).
12. E.g., Brandt v. Winchell, 3 N.Y.2d 628, 634-35, 148 N.E.2d 160, 164, 170 N.Y.S.2d
828, 833-34 (1958).
13. Green v. Time, Inc., 3 N.Y.2d 732, 143 N.E.2d 517, 163 N.Y.S.2d 970 (1957)
(memorandum decision); see, e.g., Hart v. E. P. Dutton & Co., 197 Misc. 274, 93 N.Y.S.2d 871
(Sup. Ct. 1949), affd mem., 277 App. Div. 935, 98 N.Y.S.2d 773, motion for leave to
appeal denied, 277 App. Div. 962, 99 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (4th Dep't 1950).
14. Ruza v. Ruza, 286 App. Div. 767, 769, 146 N.Y.S.2d 808, 810 (Ist Dep't 1955).
Accord, Knapp Engraving Co. v. Keystone Photo Engraving Corp., 1 App. Div. 2d 170, 172,
148 N.Y.S.2d 635, 637 (1st Dep't 1956); Brandt v. Winchell, 283 App. Div. 338, 342, 127
N.Y.S.2d 865, 868 (1st Dep't 1954).
15. See cases cited note 14 supra.
16. 24 App. Div. 2d at 287, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 409; Penn-Ohio Steel Corp. v. Allis-Chalmers
Mfg. Co., 7 App. Div. 2d 441, 444, 184 N.Y.S.2d 58, 61, modified on other grounds, 8 App.
Div. 2d 808, 187 N.Y.S.2d 476 (1st Dep't 1959) (memorandum decision).
17. The phrase was first used in Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 206 (1904).
18. E.g., Reinforce, Inc. v. Birney, 308 N.Y. 164, 169-70, 124 N.E.2d 104, 106 (1954);
Advance Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 296 N.Y. 79, 83, 70 N.E.2d 401, 402 (1946),
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business, since his self-interest in avoiding competition would negate disin-
terested malice. 19 The second view requires only intent to do the act." Thus, if
the defendant-employer, for his own purposes, gives false information as to the
wages paid to plaintiff-employee, and plaintiff thereafter has difficulties with
the tax authorities, prima facie tort will lie.21
As to the requirement that plaintiff be damaged, all the clear holdings require
that special damages be alleged and proven. 22 Further, while no holding denying
relief on this ground has been found, there are some dicta to the effect that
prima facie tort only contemplates certain types of harm.23
The remaining element to be discussed is that the defendant's conduct must
be unjustified. This requires the court to balance conflicting interests. In every
case, the plaintiff will have an interest in avoiding the type of harm he sustained,
and the defendant will usually have an interest at stake which led him to do the
acts which injured the plaintiff.24 On a larger scale, society will often have a
reason for encouraging or discouraging certain conduct in question.25
At one time, leading authorities on tort law disagreed as to whether the tradi-
19. When applied to labor unions, the doctrine seems to require the union to pursue the
court's conception of self-interest, not its own. That is, the acts of a union which harm an
employer or worker must be in furtherance of a "lawful labor objective"-a term that does
not include, for example, an attempt to increase membership-or else they will be actionable.
E.g., Opera on Tour, Inc. v. Weber, 285 N.Y. 348, 355, 34 N.E.2d 349, 352, cert. denied, 314
U.S. 615 (1941) ; Barile v. Fisher, 197 Misc. 493, 498, 94 N.Y.S.2d 346, 352 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
20. E.g., American Guild of Musical Artists, Inc. v. Petrillo, 286 N.Y. 226, 231, 36 N.E.2d
123, 125 (1941) ; Bloomer v. Thermal Fuel Corp., 88 N.Y.S.2d 361, 365-66 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
21. Gale v. Ryan, 263 App. Div. 76, 31 N.Y.S.2d 732 (1st Dep't 1941); accord, Penn-Ohio
Steel Corp. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 7 App. Div. 2d 441, 184 N.Y.S.2d 58, modified on
other grounds, 8 App. Div. 2d 808, 187 N.Y.S.2d 476 (1st Dep't 1959) (memorandum decision).
22. E.g., Nichols v. Item Publishers, Inc., 309 N.Y. 596, 602, 132 N.E.2d 860, 863 (1956) ;
Zausner v. Fotochrome, Inc., 18 App. Div. 2d 649, 235 N.Y.S.2d 698 (1st Dep't 1962)
(memorandum decision); Ritner v. Harris, Upham & Co., 46 Misc. 2d 567, 569, 260
N.Y.S.2d 379, 381 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
23. "The injury [in prima facie tort] is ordinarily to trade, occupation, professional
reputation or property, and generally comprehends interference with some form of con-
tractual relation . . . " Brandt v. Winchell, 283 App. Div. 338, 342, 127 N.Y.S.2d 865, 868
(1st Dep't 1954) (dictum); accord, Ruza v. Ruza, 286 App. Div. 767, 770, 146 N.Y.S.2d 808,
811 (1st Dep't 1955) (dictum).
24. As indicated in note 19 supra, labor unions pursuing "lawful labor objectives" are
usually considered justified. Examples of the balancing of the litigants' interests may be
found in Note, 52 Colum. L. Rev. 503, 509-12 (1952).
25. In Brandt v. Winchell, 3 N.Y.2d 628, 148 N.E.2d 160, 170 N.Y.S.2d 828 (1958),
plaintiff alleged that defendant maliciously caused various law enforcement agencies to take
action against him. The court, assuming that any information given by the defendant was
true, held that the allegations qf malice were irrelevant, and dismissed the complaint. "The
best interests of the public are advanced by the exposure of those guilty of offenses against
the public and by the unfettered dissemination of the truth about such wrongdoers. Such a
person is entitled to immunity from civil suit at the hands of the one exposed, for the truth
is not to be shackled by fear of a civil action for damages." Id. at 635, 148 N.E.2d at 164,
170 N.Y.S.2d at 834.
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tional classifications of torts were all inclusive.2 The existence of the prima
facie tort doctrine shows New York's position clearly. However, the question is
raised whether the traditional torts and prima fade tort together include all
actionable intentional wrongs. Before answering this, the desirability of such a
result should be questioned. "It seems inadvisable to lump all malicious and
intentional harms into a grab bag labelled 'prima facie tort', especially since it
is impossible to tabulate the infinite varieties of misconduct that give rise to
actionable wrongs." 27 This provides a tentative answer as long as the prima
fade tort doctrine is inflexible. So long as disinterested malevolence is required,
and only certain types of harm are contemplated, and special damages are a
prerequisite to recovery, and the acts complained of must be otherwise lawful
and moral, then many plaintiffs deserving of recovery will be denied access to
a prima facie tort cause of action. In this event, it is to be hoped that the courts
would provide a third alternative to traditional and prima facie torts.
On the other hand, prima facie tort could be kept flexible enough to meet
changing needs. If the broad basis is only intent, foreseeable harm, and absence
of justification, then further qualifications could be built into specific cases or
types of cases as needed, and further alternatives would be unnecessary.
The instant court adopted the narrow view of prima facie tort, defining it as
"otherwise lawfully privileged means . . . made actionable, because without
economic or social justification, and because of the exclusive purpose to injure
plaintiff .... " 28 The plaintiff failed to meet this test because "the means used
[by the defendants] were not lawful or privileged, in the sense of affirmatively
sanctioned conduct, but were intentional falsehood without benevolent purpose
uttered to induce action by another to his detriment .0 Since the court was
apparently intent on adopting the narrow view of prima fade tort, it could also
have rejected a prima fade tort claim on the ground that defendants were not
motivated by actual malice, as well as on the ground that special damages were
not pleaded.
The plaintiff's failure to bring his case within the ambit of prima facie tort
did not, however, bar a recovery.
[E]very element in plaintiff's claim descriptive of defendants' acts, his reliance, and
the harm sustained, are identifiable in the most ancient of the tort categories and in
the law of negligence. What is more important, the elements of defendants' conduct
26. In Salmond, Torts 9 (5th ed. 1920), it is said that "just as the criminal law consists
of a body of rules establishing specific offences, so the law of torts consists of a body of
rules establishing specific injuries." On the other hand, Pollock, Torts 22-23 (9th ed. 1912),
maintained that "as our law of contract has been generalized by the doctrine of considera-
tion and the action of assumpsit, so has our law of civil wrongs by the wide and various
applications of actions on the case." (Footnote omitted.)
27. Penn-Ohio Steel Corp. v. Aliis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 7 App. Div. 2d 441, 443, 184
N.Y.S.2d 58, 60, modified on other grounds, 8 App. Div. 2d 808, 187 N.Y.S.2d 476 (lst Dep't
1959) (memorandum decision). This language was quoted favorably in the instant case, 24
App. Div. 2d at 291, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 413.
28. Id. at 287, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 409-10.
29. Id. at 287, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 409.
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and the harm to plaintiff fall neatly within general principles of law, even if not within
any of the numbered forms of a form book. The intentional use of wrongful means
and the intentional exposure of another to the known, unreasonable risk of harm, which
results in such harm, provides classic basis for remedy. The harm must, of course,
have been intended, foreseeable, or the "natural consequence" of the wrong.80
After establishing defendants' conduct as tortious, the court turned to the
issue of damages. It was held that allegations of general damage were sufficient
to sustain the complaint.31 The court granted that special damages are required
in a prima facie tort situation, but where conduct is "corrupt," "intentional," or
"vicious," as here, "the law will allow general recovery for foreseeable harm to
established protected interests .... ". 32 The test is that the general harm alleged
must ordinarily flow from the wrong.83 Therefore, here, where the plaintiff is
beginning his career as a college professor, the law will presume damage when
he is labelled a cheater.34
Allowing the recovery of general damages in what is essentially a prima facie
tort situation is unprecedented. However, the holding is salutary in that it
reflects an ability to apply different criteria to differing cases. This flexibility is
the most important feature of the instant case. While the court alternately
characterized its holding as based on classic principles, and as creating a new
tort, in fact, it was merely adopting the broad view of prima facie tort. 5 But in
30. Id. at 288, 266 N.YS.2d at 410. But see Marinello v. Iozzo, 18 N.Y.2d 730,-N.E.2d-,
-N.Y.S.2d-(1966) (memorandum decision) (semble).
With this statement as the theory of the tort, there was no longer any limitations problem
since the facts then fell into the six-year "all other cases" provision of N.Y. C.P.L.R. 213(1).
24 App. Div. 2d at 292, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 414.
One justice rejected the majority's theory of upholding the complaint, because the basic
pattern of facts alleged by the plaintiff was not at all novel. Id. at 296-98, 266 N.Y.S.2d at
418-19 (Steuer, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 293, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 415. The plaintiff alleged that he had reason to believe he
would have received a fellowship but for the harm to his reputation. To qualify as an alle-
gation of special damages, he would have had to allege that he actually would have received
it. Id. at 293 n.4, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 415 n.4.
32. Id. at 293, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 415.
33. Id. at 294-95, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 415-16.
34. Id. at 293-94, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 415-16. The want of an allegation of special damages
prompted one Justice to dissent in part. Id. at 295, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 417 (separate opinion).
One case cited in support of this dissent was Penn-Ohio Steel Corp. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg., Co.,
7 App. Div. 2d 941, 184 N.Y.S.2d 58, modified on other grounds, 8 App. Div. 2d 808, 187
N.Y.S.2d 476 (1st Dep't 1959) (memorandum decision). But the Penn-Ohio case resulted In
subsequent litigation, and eventually the claim of general damages was allowed, on the
authority, inter alia, of the instant case. 50 Misc. 2d 860, 877-79, 272 N.Y.S.2d 266, 284-86
(Sup. Ct. 1966).
35. Thus, although the instant court's discussion of prima facie tort supports the con-
tention that "in New York the prima facie tort doctrine has apparently had Its greatest
degree of legal . . . qualification," Forkosch, An Analysis of the "Prima Facie Tort" Cause
of Action, 42 Cornell L.Q. 465, 475 (1957) (emphasis omitted), the practical effect of the
present holding is to render this statement insignificant.
CASE NOTES
so doing, it has left behind the arbitrary qualifications sometimes put on that
doctrine. The result is to leave the way open for rules to account for all liability
for intentional acts, these rules to be tailored to the cases as they arise. The
present court is to be applauded for refusing to apply "slavish formalism" ao to
both the substantive claim and to the rule of damages.
Unfair Competition-Utilization of News Taken From Defendant's Wire
Service Held To Be Actionable as an Appropriation.-Plaintiff and defendant
each sold daily publications which reported news on various government bond
offerings. The plaintiff also operated a teletype service which furnished financial
information to its subscribers in advance of publication of either of the news
sheets. The defendant, although not a subscriber, was obtaining information
from the teletype service and including it in its own publication. The New York
supreme court denied the plaintiff a temporary injunction restraining defendant's
use of the information. The appellate division reversed, holding that the de-
fendant had "appropriated"' the plaintiff's news, and had thereby engaged in
unfair competition.2 Bond Buyer v. Dealers Digest Publishing Co., 25 App.
Div. 2d 158, 267 N.Y.S.2d 944 (1st Dep't 1966) (per curiam).
The instant court's sole reliance was placed on International News Serv. v.
Associated Press,3 while two recent United States Supreme Court companion
cases, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.4 and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc.,5 were ignored. In the International News decision, the litigants
36. 24 App. Div. 2d at 295, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 417.
1. Bond Buyer v. Dealers Digest Publishing Co., 25 App. Div. 2d 158, 159, 267
N.Y.S.2d 944, 945 (1st Dep't 1966) (per curiam). The terms appropriation and misappro-
priation are generally used interchangeably. Attempts have been made to define misappro-
priation. One court called it the doctrine that "holds it unlawful for a business, without
proper efforts of its own, to capitalize on the expenses and endeavors of another." Con-
tinental Cas. Co. v. Beardsley, 151 F. Supp. 28, 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). It has been said to
concern itself with the "protection of intangibles of potential commercial value .... Mis-
appropriation consists .. . in copying . . - the conception or underlying intangible value
for the use of the appropriator." Developments in the Law-Competitive Torts, 77 Harv.
L. Rev. 888, 932 (1964).
For a more detailed discussion of the law of unfair competition, see Callmann, Unfair
Competition and Trade-Marks (2d ed. 1950); Chafee, Unfair Competition, 53 Harv. L.
Rev. 1289 (1940); Handler, Unfair Competition, 21 Iowa L. Rev. 175 (1936); Develop-
ments in the Law-Competitive Torts, supra.
2. The plaintiff apparently did not hold a statutory copyright in the instant case since
he assuredly would have pleaded it. It is unclear whether the plaintiff would even have been
able to secure such a right. See Triangle v. New England Newspaper Publishing Co., 46 F.
Supp. 198 (D. Mass. 1942). Cf. Tribune Co. v. Associated Press, 116 Fed. 126 (C.C.N.D. Ill.
1900).
3. 248 US. 215 (1918).
4. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
5. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
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were competitors in the gathering and distribution of news for profit. INS was
taking items from the subscribing newspapers of the Associated Press and
selling this information to its own subscribers. The nation's quadripartite time
zones enabled the defendant to furnish its west coast members with timely news
from the eastern seaboard. The Supreme Court granted injunctive relief on
a theory of "misappropriation," the misappropriation consisting in the de-
fendant's "taking material that has been acquired by complainant as the result
of organization and the expenditure of labor, skill, and money, and which is
salable by complainant for money, and . . . appropriating it and selling it as
its own ... ."6
The Court admitted that relief could not be predicated on any recognizable
property right or copyright,7 but held that the AP possessed "quasi property"
rights8 with all the attributes of property.9 This protectible interest, however,
existed only between the litigants, the Court eschewing the possibility of en-
joining any use that the public might make of the news.10 The ratio decidendi
of International News was simply that the defendant's practice was, in the eyes
of the majority, a form of unfair competition that should be prohibited."
Dicta in the opinion couched the misappropriation theory in sweeping terms,12
6. 248 U.S. at 239. While the International News case is the "acknowledged headwaters"
of the misappropriation doctrine, Developments in the Law-Competitive Torts, supra note
1, at 933, its genesis can be traced to earlier decisions. E.g., National Tel. News Co. v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 119 Fed. 294 (7th Cir. 1902) (using information on ticker tapes);
Kiernan v. Manhattan Quotation Tel. Co., 50 How. Pr. 194 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1876) (trans-
mission of foreign news).
7. 248 U.S. at 235. A common law copyright belongs to anyone who embodies a "new and
innocent product of mental labor" in some material form, Palmer v. De Witt, 47 N.Y. 532,
537 (1872), and it is the right to first publication. Pushman v. New York Graphic Soc'y,
287 N.Y. 302, 39 N.E.2d 249 (1942). Such a right is perpetual, Caliga v. Inter Ocean News-
paper Co., 215 U.S. 182 (1909), until there has been a publication amounting to a dedication
to the public. Palmer v. De Witt, supra at 543. On the question of publication, see Werckmelster
v. American Lithographic Co., 134 Fed. 321 (2d Cir. 1904). The statutory copyright, enacted by
Congress under the power granted to it by U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, is a "limited monopolistic
privilege," Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal. 2d. 715, 734, 299 P.2d 257, 271 (1956), granting the
privilege of exclusive publication during a definite period. Caliga v. Inter Ocean Newspaper
Co., supra. When Congress enacted the statutory copyright, it expressly retained the one at
common law. 17 U.S.C. § 2 (1964).
8. 248 U.S. at 236.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid. Pragmatic considerations probably weighed on the Court's decision, since there
was fear that INS, by avoiding the AP's news gathering costs and thus being able to charge
lower rates, would drive the AP out of business. Developments in the Law-Competitive
Torts, supra note 1, at 934.
11. See 2 Calimann, op. cit. supra note 1, at 882 n.22.
12. As competitors, "each party is under a duty so to conduct its own business as not
unnecessarily or unfairly to injure that of the other." 248 U.S. at 235-36. The defendant
should not "reap where it has not sown" and "is appropriating to itself the harvest of those
who have sown." Id. at 239-40.
One commentator reasoned that the logic of the International News decision "supports
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yet the legal theory there expounded has led a checkered existence.' 3 New
York cases subsequent to International News, however, have expressed a liberal
policy in deciding misappropriation cases so that "commercial unfairness will
be restrained when it appears that there has been a misappropriation, for the
commercial advantage of one person, of a benefit or property right belonging to
another."14
While Internationdl News affirmed a state's prerogative to furnish relief in
the event that neither common-law copyright nor federal statute was adequate
to bestow protection, 15 the Supreme Court apparently took a different approach
in Sears'6 and Compco.'7
In both those cases, plaintiffs were lamp manufacturers who had originated
and patented lighting fixtures. The defendants began producing "Chinese
copies,"' 8 and the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief. The patents were held in-
valid by the lower courts, 19 and the Supreme Court, deciding both cases on the
protection against any competition by similar products where it can be shown that the
originator has invested something of value in the development of his product." Treece, Patent
Policy and Preemption: The Stiffel and Compco Cases, 32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 80, 94 (1964).
13. See Developments in the Law-Competitive Torts, supra note 1. See also Triangle
Publications, Inc. v. New England Newspaper Publishing Co., 46 F. Supp. 198, 203-OS
(D. Mass. 1942).
The classic refusal to extend International News beyond its facts was voiced by Judge
Learned Hand in Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929), cerL denied,
281 U.S. 728 (1930), when he maintained that the International News was that type of
case where "the occasion is at once the justification for, and the limit of, what is decided."
Id. at 280. Cheney Bros. involved a situation analagous to International News-viz, style
piracy. However, outside of a competitor gaining access to another's fashions through breach
of trust, Richard J. Cole Inc. v. Manhattan Modes Co., 159 N.Y.S.2d 709 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd,
2 App. Div. 2d 593, 157 N.Y.S.2d 259 (1st Dep't 1956) (per curiam); accord, Win. Filene's
Sons Co. v. Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc., 14 F. Supp. 353 (D. Mass. 1936). aftd,
90 F.2d 556 (1st Cir. 1937), or infringement of common-law copyright, Dior v. Milton, 9
Misc. 2d 425, 155 N.Y.S.2d 443 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 2 App. Div. 2d 878, 156 N.Y.S.2d 996
(1st Dep't 1956), the courts have been adamant in withholding relief once a designer has put
his creations on the market. Millinery Creators' Guild, Inc. v. FTC, 109 F.2d 175 (2d Cir.
1940), aff'd, 312 US. 469 (1941) ; Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., supra; Win. Filene's Sons
Co. v. Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. supra.
Neither the proposed revision of the copyright law, H.R. 4347, 89th Cong, 1st Sess, nor
a pending design protection act would afford any protection to fashion designers. Hearings on
H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680, H.R. 6831, & H.R. 6835 Before a Subcommittee of the House Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 8, pts. 1 & 2 (1965).
14. Dior v. Milton, supra note 13, at 431, 155 N.Y.S.2d at 451.
15. See notes 7-9 supra and accompanying text.
16. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
17. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
18. A "Chinese copy" is a duplication that is an exact imitation of the original. See 1
Callmann, op. cit. supra note 1, at 249.
19. The opinions of the district courts are unreported, but the decisions can be found
in Stiffel Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1963), reversed, 376 US. 225
(1964) ; and Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Compco Corp., 311 F.2d 26 (7th Cir. 1962), reversed,
376 U.S. 234 (1964).
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same day, ruled that anything in the public domain could be freely copied and
that such copying could not be enjoined under a state's unfair competition
laws.2 0 One commentator has stated:
The Supreme Court's rationale proceeds along the traditional lines of federal preemp-
tion. The federal patent system, specifically authorized by the Constitution, establishes
a uniform federal standard for the protection of invention and the preservation of
free competition. To give patent-like protection under state law to an article incapable
of a patent grant runs counter to federal policy .... 21
A result similar to that in Sears and Compco had been reached by some courts
even before International News.22 While Sears and Cornpco did not explicitly
overrule the earlier decision-in fact, they did not even mention it-the cases
pose the question of whether the misappropriation theory has been antedated. 2
The misappropriation doctrine has been emphatically rejected by two cases 4
involving community antenna television systems (CATV).25 The most recent one,
20. In Compco the Court said that, unless protected by a federal statute, a design could be
"copied at will." 376 U.S. at 238. Sears propounded substantially the same thought. 376 U.S.
at 231.
21. Handier, in Symposium, Product Simulation: A Right or a Wrong, 64 Colum. L.
Rev. 1178, 1185 (1964). (Footnote omitted.)
22. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938) (reproducing the same
shape cereal biscuit) ; Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896) (using design
and name of previously patented sewing machine); Flagg Mfg. Co. v. Holway, 178 Mass.
83, 59 N.E. 667 (1901) (copying a zither); American Merri-Lei Corp. v. Jet Party Favors,
Inc., 123 N.Y.S.2d 136 (Sup. Ct. 1953) (copying halloween hats). In the Kellogg case, the
court stated that "sharing in the goodwill of an article unprotected by patent or trade-mark
is the exercise of a right possessed by all--and in the free exercise of which the consuming
public is deeply interested." 305 U.S. at 122.
23. This is merely one issue that the companion cases have raised. For other problems
that have arisen in their wake, see Peterson, The Legislative Mandate of Sears and Compco:
A Plea for a Federal Law of Unfair Competition, 69 Dick. L. Rev. 347, 358-63 (1965).
It is interesting to note that International News is nowhere mentioned in either the
Supreme Court opinions or the briefs of either plaintiffs or defendants. However, the
government, contributing its own brief as one of the defendant's amid, cites it, but only
to the effect that the issues at bar and those in International News were not legally
contiguous. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, p. 11, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
One writer remarked that Sears and Compco impliedly rejected the "misappropriation"
theory. Treece, supra note 12, at 90.
24. Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 335 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
989 (1965); Herald Publishing Co. v. Florida Antennavision Inc., 173 So. 2d 469 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
25. Historically, CATV has confined itself to receiving television signals and amplifying
them so that its paying subscribers who lived in remote regions and could not ordinarily
receive the programs might be able to enjoy the broadcasts. However, CATV has been
burgeoning to the point where it has been invading areas which are already occupied by
a licensed broadcaster. Hearings on H.R. 4347 Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee
on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 8, pt. 2, at 1223-26 (1965). See generally Note,
CATV: Liability for the Uncompensated Transmission of Television Programs, 50 Minn. L.
Rev. 349 (1965).
Herald Publishing Co. v. Florida Antennavision, Inc.,20 distinguished Inter-
national News as being inapplicable when the litigants are not in direct com-
petition,27 and refused to enjoin the plaintiff on the grounds that to do so
would be violating Sears and Compco by extending a " 'new protectible interest
beyond what the copyright laws confer ... .' '28
While the Idaho district court in Intermountain Broadcasting & Television v.
Idaho Microwave, Inc.2 had reached a similar result prior to Sears and Compco,
a pre-1964 New York decision, Mutual Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Muzak
Corp.,30 involving an analogous fact pattern, was decided otherwise. There,
the plaintiff had secured a contract to broadcast the 1941 baseball world series.
The defendant intercepted the plaintiff's radio signals and channelled them to
his own listeners. The defendant's conduct was enjoined because he had invaded
the "plaintiff's right" as enunciated in International News.3 1 Such a case could
conceivably be decided otherwise today in light of Sears and Comipco.
The liberal outlook of New York evidenced by the Mutual Broadcasting case
and many others32 has been continued in its post-Sears and Conpco decisions.
In New York World's Fair 1964-1965 Corp. v. Colourpicture Publishers Inc.,'
a defendant who had unsuccessfully bid for a contract to make and market re-
26. 173 So. 2d 469 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
27. Id. at 472. The New York courts have long since discarded this requisite in mis-
appropriation cases. See, e.g., Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp.,
199 Misc. 786, 795, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483, 491-92 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd mem., 279 App. Div. 632,
107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1st Dep't 1951).
28. Herald Publishing Co. v. Florida Antennavision Inc., 173 So. 2d 469, 474 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1965), quoting from Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 335 F2d 348, 351 (9th
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989 (1965). Both recent CATV cases left open the possibility
of an action for copyright infringement. Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc, supra; Herald
Publishing Co. v. Florida Antennavision Inc., supra (by implication). A court in the
Second Circuit chose this path when it found a CATV station guilty of infringing the plaintiff
broadcaster's statutory copyright. United Artists Television, Inc. v. Fortnightly Corp, 255
F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
The proposed revision of the copyright law will certainly have an adverse effect on the
development of CATV. The "transmission" of copyrighted material, such as CATV provides,
would be permissible only if there were no "direct or indirect admission charge." Hearings on
H.R. 4347 Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess., ser. 8, pt. 1, at 5 (1965).
29. 196 F. Supp. 315 (S.D. Idaho 1961).
30. 177 Misc. 489, 30 N.Y.S.2d 419 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
31. Id. at 491, 30 N.Y.S.2d at 420. There was no discussion of the issues, the court merely
concluding that the "plaintiff's right has been invaded by defendant and that plaintiff is
entitled to the injunction sought." Ibid.
In another decision decided before Sears and Compco, Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV
Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (Wi). Pa. 1938), a radio station was restrained from
stationing its observers outside a stadium and using their reports to broadcast an account
of Pittsburgh games. Fitting the fact into the International News mold, the court found the
plaintiff to have acquired through its efforts a property right in the broadcasting of the
game with which the defendant was wrongfully interfering.
32. See, e.g., note 14 supra and accompanying text.
33. 21 App. Div. 2d 896, 251 N.Y.S.2d 885 (2d Dep't 1964) (memorandum decision).
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productions of World's Fair buildings was restrained from producing the re-
productions. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Documentaries Unlimited,
Inc.34 held that to take an off-the-air radio broadcast of an announcement of the
late President Kennedy's death and press this onto a marketable record was
an unlawful appropriation. Similarly, in Capitol Records, Inc. v. Greatest
Records, Inc.,3 5 a record manufacturer was enjoined from utilizing a remastering
process to reproduce Beatles' records, again on a theory of misappropriation.
Making no reference to International News and deciding the case on common law
copyright, the court stated in dicta that New York law protects a "plaintiff from
unauthorized reproduction of the performances embodied on a master recording,
basing such protection upon the doctrines of unfair competition, common-law
copyright or unlawful interference with contract."3 6
The Capitol Records court took great pains to point out that Sears and
Compco were inapplicable there, resting its conclusion on an attempted distinc-
tion between a misappropriation and a copy.37 Sears and Compco dealt with
items "substantially identical "38 and were concerned with "imitation,"80 while
the issue sub judice was whether there had been an appropriation of the very
product itself.40
A similar effort to circumvent Sears and Compco was made in Flamingo
Telefilm Sales, Inc. v. United Artists Corp.41 There a defendant who exhibited
a television program into which he had incorporated a large segment of a mo-
tion picture controlled by the plaintiff was prohibited from further telecasting.
The court stated that "it is clear ... that if defendants had copied the movie
concerned and produced their own movie based upon the same plot and themes,
plaintiff would be entitled to no protection outside of the Federal copyright
laws. There is a distinction between such an act, i.e., the copying of an idea,
and the . ..use of the identical product for the profit of another." 42
Yet one New York court chose not to make any distinction between a
misappropriation and a copy. In Wolf & Vine, Inc. v. Pioneer Display Fixtures
Co.,4 3 the defendant came into possession of several of plaintiff's highly creative
34. 42 Misc. 2d 723, 248 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct. 1964). This case was originally decided
before Sears and Compco, but the court, after considering the defendant's application for
reargument, dismissed the Supreme Court's decisions as being inapplicable to questions of
common law copyright, which was one theory under which the case could be and was in
fact decided.
35. 43 Misc. 2d 878, 252 N.Y.S.2d 553 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
36. Id. at 880, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 555.
37. Id. at 880-81, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 556.
38. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 266 (1964).
39. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Greatest Records, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 878, 880-81, 252 N.Y.S.2d
553, 556 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
40. Id. at 881, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 556.
41. 141 U.S.P.Q. 461 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), rev'd on other grounds, 22 App. Div. 2d 778, 254
N.Y.S.2d 36 (1st Dep't 1964) (memorandum decision).
42. Id. at 462.
43. 142 U.S.P.Q. 112 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964).
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mannequins and made production-line molds of them from which replicas were
thereafter produced and offered for sale in direct competition with those manu-
factured by the plaintiff. Sears and Compco were invoked in this case to permit
the defendant to continue his activities.
Both the 1918 and the 1964 Supreme Courts were confronted with the
necessity of striking a balance between free access to novel and marketable
creations and adequate protection to an economically injured originator."
Sears and Compco appear to have favored free access in accordance with
Justice Brandeis' note when he dissented in International News: "The general
rule of law is, that the noblest of human productions-knowledge, truths ascer-
tained, conceptions, and ideas-become, after voluntary communication to
others, free as the air to common use."41
The New York courts, both before and after Sears and Compco have at-
tempted to throw a protecting arm around the injured plaintiff.46 After Sears
and Compco, the state courts, capitalizing on the failure of the Court to
explicitly overrule International News, have distinguished those cases as dealing
with a copy rather than a misappropriation. 47
In some instances, the distinction might seem a proper one. The defendant,
in Flamingo Telefilm Sales, Inc. v. United Artists Corp."4 incorporated a seg-
ment of a motion picture into a television program and was dearly doing more
than copying the plaintiff's ideas. However, how did making a mold from a
plaintiff's mannequin amount, in Wolf & Vine, to a lawful copy rather than an
unlawful appropriation?"9 There was no significant distinction, for example, be-
tween this situation and the fact pattern laid before the World's Fair court,60
and yet the results were quite dissimilar.
The insufficiency of such a distinction is best illustrated by the dissenting
opinion in World's Fair, where the judge commented that "if the buildings and
exhibits, the designs of which have not been patented, could themselves have
been copied by others, it would appear that photographic reproductions of
these buildings and exhibits for the purpose of sales cannot be enjoined."5'
Obviously any effort to distinguish between a misappropriation and a copy
raises patent difficulties. First, neither concept has ever been adequately de-
fined, 2 and yet courts continually select one or the other label on the basis of
44. The existence of this tension is adverted to in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,
376 U.S. 225, 231-32 (1964).
45. 248 U.S. at 250.
46. See notes 14 and 32-42 supra and accompanying text.
47. See note 23 supra.
48. 141 U.S.P.Q. 461 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), rev'd on other grounds, 22 App. Div. 2d 778, 2S4
N.Y.S.2d 36 (1st Dep't 1964) (memorandum decision).
49. 142 U.S.P.Q. 112 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964).
50. 21 App. Div. 2d 896, 251 N.Y.S.2d 885 (2d Dep't 1964) (memorandum decision).
51. Id. at 898, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 888.
52. The definitions of misappropriation set down in note 1 supra are dearly inadequate
in light of Sears and Compco.
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unexpressed reasoning, as was done in the instant case. Secondly, in all cases
of this type, the defendant has capitalized on the labor and skill of the plaintiff
to the latter's financial detriment. Yet only some plaintiffs obtain the requested
relief. The degree of the defendant's unfairness and the plaintiff's loss are
ignored as the courts make distinctions based upon apparently artificial grounds.
The obstacles presented in making the distinction have placed a heavy burden
on the courts. Since Sears and Compco have expressed a policy which is, at
least to some extent, antithetical to International News, 3 the courts must de-
lineate the respective areas of the cases. If there should be a distinction between
a misappropriation and a copy, then workable ground rules for making such
a differentiation must be set down. It appears that the instant court, unable to
find a valid point on which to distinguish Sears and Compco, erred in not
following them.
53. See text accompanying notes 15-23.
